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• We examine the productivity and convergence behaviour of SSM-supervised banks 
• A novel approach that tests for convergence in multiple dimensions is proposed 
• We introduce the concept of convergence in productivity and technology 
• We find strong evidence of absolute convergence and therefore integration  
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Abstract 
The paper examines the behavioural patterns arising from the analysis of productivity and convergence 
in European banking, using a sample of commercial banks regulated by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, during 2011 to 2017. Productivity change and its decompositions is measured for each 
input and output dimension separately, using a variant of the multidirectional productivity analysis 
framework. We introduce a novel approach for testing for 𝛽-convergence in productivity, efficiency 
and technology, as well as in each dimension considered. We find strong evidence of absolute 
convergence during the period of study, suggesting that bank operations move towards a common 
frontier rather than local equilibria. Prior to the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2013, 
conditional convergence is confirmed in many instances with respect to liquidity and capital adequacy, 
although few cases remain significant in the subsequent period. We conclude that regulatory controls 
have facilitated integration, though there are important implications arising that policymakers need to 
consider when designing policies. 
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The integration of the European banking sector has been a long-standing goal for European authorities, 
with the First Banking Directive of 1977 marking the first significant attempt. Differences in the 
institutional framework of European banking have been an impeding factor, though they have gradually 
diminished. Despite the continuous progress over the last four decades, with the most notable recent 
example being the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), significant barriers to 
integration still exist, especially in retail and small business banking (Goddard et al., 2015). Additional 
challenges are imposed due to the substantial differences in productivity and technology across 
European banking sectors and within each country (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Kontolaimou et al., 
2012). Convergence in productivity, which is a cited antecedent for integration, has been mainly proxied 
by measures of convergence in efficiency and productivity change, rather than being estimated directly. 
Aggregate measures of efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) are mainly used which cannot 
account for uneven technical change; the fact that productivity can grow at different rates or even 
direction with respect to each input and output that defines the banking technology. This paper proposes 
a novel approach that allows to test for convergence in each dimension of productivity and its 
components, introducing in this context the notion of convergence in technology.  
In the economic literature, 𝛽-convergence examines the hypothesis that low-income counties are 
expected to grow faster than richer ones, catching up with the higher per capita GDP levels of the latter 
(Baumol, 1986; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  In the banking literature, no formal definition has been 
offered, though it could be argued that, under the neoclassical framework, less productive firms (banks) 
are expected to intensify their efforts in catching up with more productive ones to avoid being driven 
out of competition, thus exhibiting a higher pace of productivity growth. This has direct implications 
for the two frequently used components of productivity change: efficiency change and technical change. 
That is, if banks are assumed to exhibit similar levels of productivity in the long run, they should also 
do so for efficiency and technology. While efficiency convergence has been well-examined in the 
literature, the notion of convergence in technology has not been yet considered. We define convergence 
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in technology as the extent to which banks have access to and make use of the same technological and 
financial innovations, so that they can all attain the same frontier that reflects the level of technology. 
The empirical literature on convergence in European banking offers results that vary with the period 
examined or the approach followed, while it reveals gaps that we address in this paper.1 First, to our 
knowledge, no study has previously examined for convergence in productivity and its components, 
namely convergence in efficiency and technology, defined above. The yet few studies test for 
convergence in the growth rate of productivity and its decompositions (Degl’Innocenti et al., 2017; Fujii 
et al., 2018), suggesting that this is a promising area for further development. Second, convergence 
analysis is based on aggregate measures of efficiency and productivity change, rather than being 
evaluated with respect to each input and output, separately. The closest approach is offered by Fujii et 
al. (2018) who test for convergence in the contribution of each individual input to bank inefficiency.2 
Finally, conditional convergence has not received adequate attention in the banking literature (Casu et 
al., 2016). This is particularly important since certain banks may converge to different equilibria 
influenced by country characteristics, institutional differences, regulation or other factors associated 
with the environment in which banks operate.  
This paper proposes a novel approach that estimates conditional 𝛽-convergence in productivity, 
efficiency and technology for each input and output dimension considered, thus addressing the 
identified gaps. We apply our framework on the commercial banks supervised by the SSM during the 
period from 2011 to 2017, which includes challenges for integration, such as the European sovereign 
debt crisis, but also opportunities, such as the creation of the SSM. To evaluate productivity in each 
dimension and decomposition, we build on the multidirectional productivity change (MPC) model of 
 
1 Previous studies on European banking have tested for convergence in cost efficiency (Mamatzakis et al., 2008; 
Weil, 2009) and technical efficiency (Casu and Girardone, 2010; Matousek et al., 2015), conditional convergence 
in technical efficiency (Casu et al., 2016), as well as convergence in productivity change and its decompositions 
(Degl’Innocenti et al., 2017; Fujii et al., 2018).  
2 Fujii et al. (2018) use a weighted Russel directional distance model which includes priority weights imposed by 
the user, to optimise the contribution of each individual input to the aggregate inefficiency of each bank, under 
the objective of minimising that aggregate level of inefficiency. That is, the individual input inefficiencies, by 
definition, sum up to the total inefficiency for each bank.  
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Asmild et al. (2016). We then introduce a novel approach for testing for 𝛽-convergence in productivity, 
efficiency and technology. Finally, to account for conditional convergence, we consider the role of 
capital adequacy and liquidity, which are important dimensions of regulatory oversight, also 
emphasized in the Basel III framework. The underlying logic is that, given the unifying role of the SSM 
in supervising and implementing a common regulatory framework for all banks, the supervised entities 
should be able to converge towards a global equilibrium, or frontier, (absolute convergence) rather than 
local ones that depend on exogenous factors (conditional convergence). 
To anticipate empirical findings, we find substantial asymmetries in the behaviour of productivity, 
efficiency and frontier catch-up of SSM-supervised banks. The creation of the SSM in 2013, has marked 
an increase in technical efficiency across all input and output dimensions considered, accompanied with 
a deterioration in the level of technology, though. We attribute this to the stricter supervision and 
additional controls from the European Central Bank (ECB), especially after 2013. Considering the full 
period of study, we find strong evidence of absolute convergence but no evidence of conditional 
convergence, indicating that SSM commercial banks converge towards a common frontier across 
dimensions. We attribute this to the role of the SSM and the introduction of additional controls after 
2013, given that, before that time, we find conditional convergence with respect to the two regulatory 
variables considered, while afterwards absolute convergence is stronger. Our findings carry important 
implications as we show that, although imposing additional restrictions may be conducive to 
integration, it can slow down financial and technological innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and discusses the 
choice of variables. Section 3 introduces our methodological approach. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings and the policy implications arising. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data  
We use data from the financial statements of the European commercial banks supervised directly by the 
SSM. The list of supervised ‘significant institutions’ is updated annually, according to predetermined 
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criteria linked to the importance of a bank for the host economy.3 The fact that the SSM-supervised 
commercial banks are of systemic importance and face a common regulatory framework, makes them 
suitable for a European analysis of productivity, due to the homogeneity of operations they are expected 
to have, compared to other non-SSM financial institutions. 
Our dataset spans from 2011 to 2017, which is a period of significance for the European banking 
industry. To begin with, the European sovereign debt crisis was set out in mid-2010, sparking fears for 
contagion to the financial sector. Many financial institutions faced challenges, reflected in limited 
profitability and liquidity, while the impact of the crisis on the real economy was reflected in an 
increasing trend in non-performing loans and declining investment opportunities. At the Directorate-
General for Finance meeting of 2011 in Cyprus, the intention for the creation of the SSM was 
announced, suggesting the beginning of a period of policy-induced regulatory and operational 
convergence. The creation of the SSM in 2013 marks a new period of stricter supervision and tighter 
controls by the ECB. The implementation of Basel III, the liquidity requirements specified in the 
minimum liquidity coverage ratio, as well as the capital requirements linked with stress testing, are 
some of the examples of increased regulation and supervision that followed the creation of the SSM. 
Taking also into account the liquidity injections through the quantitative easing programme of the ECB, 
suggested that financial institutions would need to reconsider their strategies. 
To measure efficiency and productivity change we define the input-output system as an extension 
of the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), which views financial institutions as 
intermediaries that use capital and labour to convert liabilities into assets. Under this approach, banks 
use capital (Fixed Assets), labour (Staff Expenses) and deposits (Customer Deposits) to produce loans 
 
3 The criteria for significance for a financial institution that the ECB has set out include (i) total assets in excess 
of €30 billion, (ii) total assets in excess of €30 billion but with more than 20% ratio of cross-border assets to 
liabilities in more than one EU countries, (iii) it has requested or received funding from the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) or the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), or (iv) it is of economic importance to the 
country that it is based in or for the whole EU economy. It is also noted that the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) was created as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism by the Euro area Member States in June 
2010. The assistance that EFSF provided was financed by bonds and other debt instruments issued by the 
organisation. The role of the EFSF is now performed by the ESM.  
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(Net Loans) and other income-generating securities (Other Earning Assets). To avoid imposing 
restrictive assumptions on the nature of deposits as inputs or outputs, we treat them as non-discretionary 
inputs as in Asmild and Matthews (2012).4 The logic is that banks desire to maintain a certain level of 
deposits for their operations. However, if they are not income-generating, banks incur transaction and 
overhead costs for their management (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Therefore, instead of optimising 
the behaviour of banks vis-à-vis minimising or maximising deposits, we only involve this variable in 
the construction of the feasible set. Finally, we treat Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) as an undesirable 
output, effectively modelled as an input (Assaf et al., 2013; Matousek et al., 2015; Fukuyama and 
Matousek, 2017).5 While the aggregate level of NPLs largely depends on the state of the economy, they 
can vary from bank to bank, influenced by the degree of risk that each financial institution is willing to 
undertake. The greater the degree of risk aversion, the greater the effort of a bank to minimise NPLs, 
by setting stricter criteria when extending credit, which further justifies the inclusion of NPLs as a non-
desirable output in our model. 
To examine conditional convergence, we also include the Liquid Assets Ratio (liquid to total assets 
ratio, or LAR), as well as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Higher values for LAR suggest that a 
bank can effectively deal with an unexpected shock that would require using their liquid assets. At the 
same time, it indicates that the bank has more resources available to convert into income-generating 
assets. Therefore, the greater the liquidity in the market, the greater the potential for productivity growth 
in the banking sector. Liquidity gained particular significance after the implementation of minimum 
liquidity requirements by the ECB in 2014. 
The CAR is a regulatory ratio that monitors the ability of a bank to absorb losses stemming from 
exposure to risk, using own funds. A high CAR could be interpreted as a sign of stability and of good 
 
4 The theoretical background on the input versus output debate for deposits is provided in Berger and Humphrey 
(1992). A detailed account on the controversy concerning the use of deposits as an input or output in one-stage 
models is provided in Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), while for an in-depth analysis of the “deposits dilemma” and 
the approaches followed additionally in in one-stage and two-stage models, the interested reader can consult Holod 
and Lewis (2011).  
5 Assaf et al. (2013) also provide a theoretical account on this issue and show that failing to account for NPLs can 
distort the efficiency and productivity results significantly.  
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quality of assets that a bank maintains in its portfolio. Moreover, it could suggest that the bank is risk-
averse, or that it is tightly supervised and unable to freely use its resources. Tighter regulations would 
mean that banks have fewer resources available to work with, and therefore their production 
possibilities would be reduced (Tziogkidis et al., 2018). 
The average values for the inputs, outputs and the two regulatory ratios are presented in Table 1 
below, in nominal terms. We observe an increase in both liquidity and capital adequacy after 2013, 
suggesting that the change in the liquidity and capital requirements, as well as the tighter supervision, 
all had an impact on bank operations. We also find that up to 2013, average Net Customer Loans were 
higher than Customer Deposits and moving at a declining trend, while after 2013, deposits exceeded on 
average bank loans. Moreover, Other Earning Assets have substantially declined after 2014, indicating 
a potential reconsideration of banks’ portfolios in view of updated regulatory requirements. Finally, we 
observe that capital and staff-related costs appear stable, while the proportion of NPLs in relation to Net 
Customer Loans seems to be improving, indicating that banks have become more risk-averse. 
 




















2011 1,727.7 1,782.4 88,363.2 7,857.5 111,116.1 114,898.4 17.5 13.4 
2012 1,679.5 1,730.0 89,109.1 9,046.0 105,762.4 109,732.8 17.7 14.4 
2013 1,621.2 1,643.4 89,494.1 10,188.3 98,771.7 96,125.5 17.8 15.9 
2014 1,696.0 1,632.6 91,824.7 10,057.0 99,243.8 105,073.9 17.5 17.2 
2015 1,820.8 1,704.1 101,331.3 9,617.5 106,143.5 97,642.6 18.0 18.7 
2016 1,866.3 1,703.1 101,511.1 9,087.9 104,079.3 92,069.9 18.3 18.3 
2017 1,986.5 1,769.7 107,633.5 7,818.1 108,652.3 83,805.1 19.4 18.8 
Total 1,770.8 1,708.3 95,637.5 9,114.1 104,748.8 99,843.0 18.0 16.7 
Notes: The table presents the average values for the inputs (columns 2-4), the undesirable output that is treated as 
an input (column 5), the outputs (columns 6-7) and liquidity and capital adequacy ratios (columns 8-9) for each 
year of the study period. The input-output variables are in million euros, while the ratios are in percentages. 
 
3. Methodological framework 
3.1 Theoretical background  
In the context of production economics, the efficiency of a decision-making unit (DMU) is measured 
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against a frontier that characterises the level of technology. The DMUs operating on the frontier are 
efficient, while along with the input-output combinations that it envelopes, they define the feasible set. 
Formally, assuming a set of 𝑛 DMUs, 𝑝 inputs and 𝑞 outputs, the feasible set is defined as:  
𝛹 = {(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ+
𝑝+𝑞
|𝑥 can produce 𝑦}  (1) 
Considering the Farrell-Debreu definition of efficiency (Debreu, 1951; Farrell, 1957) and under the 
assumption of input (output) orientation, an inefficient DMU would need to equiproportionately 
decrease (increase) all its inputs (outputs), while maintaining its outputs (inputs) fixed until it attains 
the frontier. While in certain settings this may be a reasonable assumption, it can prove quite limiting 
within the banking context. Financial institutions, even when considering commercial banks only, can 
have substantially different operations, which can be reflected in different input-output proportions. For 
example, some banks may focus mainly on traditional banking operations whereas others may engage 
more on investment activities. Similarly, risk-averse banks may have stricter credit controls and 
maintain a lower level of non-performing loans (NPLs) compared to their peers, while similar 
arguments can be made about the technological and financial innovations used or the capital versus 
labour intensity of bank operations. Directional measures of efficiency are more suitable in this context, 
allowing for non-radial, non-oriented improvements, across all input-output dimensions (Chambers et 
al., 1998). Therefore, it is possible to analyse not just the levels, but also the patterns of efficiency of 
financial institutions. 
The direction of improvement for each input and output dimension is determined through the 
directional matrix 𝑔 = (𝑔𝑥 , 𝑔𝑦) ∈ ℝ
𝑝+𝑞, where 𝑔𝑥 = (𝑔𝑥1 , …𝑔𝑥𝑝) and 𝑔𝑦 = (𝑔𝑦1 , …𝑔𝑦𝑞). The 
directional distance function can then be defined as: 
?⃗? (𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑔𝑥 , 𝑔𝑦) = sup{𝛽 ∈ ℝ
+|(𝑥 − 𝛽𝑔𝑥 , 𝑦 + 𝛽𝑔𝑦) ∈ 𝛹}  (2) 
where 𝛽 is a multiplicative factor applied on the specified directional vectors, which together determine 
the required improvements in inputs (𝛽𝑔𝑥) and outputs (𝛽𝑔𝑦) that make a DMU efficient.  
The directional matrix 𝑔 can be common for all inputs and outputs (Färe et al., 2005), it can be 
imposed by the user according to policy objectives, it can be determined through an optimised objective 
function (Atkinson and Tsionas, 2016) or it can be chosen with respect to the maximum potential 
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improvements in each input and output dimension, via multidirectional efficiency analysis (MEA) 
(Asmild et al., 2003; Bogetoft and Hougaard, 1999). In this paper, we define the directional vectors 
using MEA. 
To measure productivity change, the Malmquist index is the most commonly used approach, which 
effectively assesses the operations of a DMU in two different periods against a fixed period’s reference 
technology (frontier). Let us denote the two time periods with 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, where 𝑡 + 1, without loss of 
generality and for ease of exposition, refers to any point in time after 𝑡. The Malmquist index with 
reference technology at time 𝑡 is defined as: 
𝑀𝑡 =
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
  (3) 
where ?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔) is the contemporaneous distance function of DMU (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡), ?⃗? 
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) is 
the cross-period distance function of DMU (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) while 𝑔 is the directional matrix to which we 
have attached no time subscript for ease of exposition. The exact definition of 𝑔 in both periods depends 
on the approach used, discussed in detail in the next subsection. Similarly, using as a reference period 
𝑡 + 1, the Malmquist index is:  
𝑀𝑡+1 =
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
  (4) 
where ?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) and ?⃗? 
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔) are the contemporaneous and cross-period distance 
functions, respectively. To avoid arbitrarily choosing between the two reference periods, the Malmquist 
index is usually defined as the geometric mean of (3) and (4): 
𝑀(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) = [
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
 ∙
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)





The index can be decomposed into efficiency change (EC) and technical change (TC), or frontier 
shift, as follows: 
𝑀(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) =  
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
∙ [
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
 ∙
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)








𝐸𝐶 =  
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)




?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)
∙
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)





Technical change captures the frontier shift between two periods and is defined as the distance of a 
reference DMU from the two frontiers. As with the Malmquist index, TC is also determined as a 
geometric mean, this time between DMU operations at 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. Denoting with 𝑇𝐶𝑡 and 𝑇𝐶𝑡+1 the 
technical change with reference to DMU (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) and (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1), respectively, we have: 
𝑇𝐶𝑡 =
?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)




?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)
 (10) 
so that 𝑇𝐶 = [𝑇𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑡+1]
1
2. We will use this disaggregation later to define convergence in technology. 
 
3.2 Multi-directional productivity change 
We measure productivity change and its decompositions using the multi-directional productivity 
change (MPC) model (Asmild et al., 2016), which has not yet received much attention in the literature. 
It builds on the multidirectional efficiency analysis (MEA) (Bogetoft and Hougaard, 1999; Asmild et 
al., 2003) and it has the advantage of allowing for the measurement of productivity change and its 
components, separately for each input and output dimension. Thus, using the MEA-Malmquist index it 
is possible not only to measure productivity change and its decompositions, but also to examine the 
patterns arising from productivity growth in each dimension.  
Similar to Asmild and Matthews (2012), we use a non-oriented model, under the assumption that 
SSM-supervised banks can exert control over both inputs and outputs, given their significance in the 
European financial markets. Moreover, since the commercial banks in our sample are systemically 
important and regulated under a common framework by the SSM, the assumption of constant returns to 
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scale (CRS) is reasonable. Given its consistency with absolute convergence in productivity, the CRS 
assumption is also in line with setting common long-run improvement targets for each bank, irrespective 
of their scale of operations. 
Finally, it is well-established in the literature that there can be infeasibilities in estimating 
productivity change using directional distance functions in general (Briec and Kerstens, 2009), or MEA 
in particular (Asmild et al., 2016). The issue arises from the calculation of cross-period distance 
functions. That is, one of the two components of technical change in (9) and (10) cannot be calculated 
in some cases. To partly deal with this issue, we proxy technical change for the problematic cases with 
whichever base-period definition is free from infeasibilities, instead of their geometric mean.  
Consider a reference DMU ‘𝑜’ and let 𝜏 = {𝑡, 𝑡 + 1} and 𝜏′ be the complement of 𝜏. Moreover, to 
make our notation appear less cluttered, we will use in this subsection appropriate superscripts on input 
and output variables to denote the period in which the reference DMU operates. To estimate the 
directional distance functions, we use MEA, which follows a two-step process. The first step identifies 
the ideal reference point (𝒙𝑜
∗,𝜏, 𝒚𝑜
∗,𝜏) = (𝑥𝑜,1
∗,𝜏 , … 𝑥𝑜,𝑝
∗,𝜏 , 𝑦𝑜,1
∗,𝜏, … 𝑦𝑜,𝑞
∗,𝜏), which determines the direction of the 
maximum potential improvements for 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑜 for each input 𝑗 = 1,…𝑝 and output 𝑟 = 1,…𝑞, 
separately. To obtain the contemporaneous distance functions, the ideal reference point is determined 







𝜏 . For 
the cross-period distance functions, we slightly divert from Asmild et al. (2016) in that the ideal 








𝜏′ . That is, for reference technology 𝜏, we use the same ideal reference point 
(𝒙𝑜
∗,𝜏, 𝒚𝑜
∗,𝜏) for both the contemporaneous and cross-period distance functions. The underlying 
assumption is that banks benchmark their operations against a fixed point of reference in both periods. 
Intuitively, we assume that a bank sets an optimal direction for improvement in the reference period 
(towards the respective ideal reference point) and evaluates its performance in the other period with 
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respect to the same target.6 
Given that it is the same for both types of distance functions, we only need to consider the following 































𝜏   𝑟 = 1,…𝑞  
 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0  
where 𝑥𝐷 corresponds to customer deposits which we treat as a non-discretionary input. In the linear 
programme, while deposits contribute in defining the feasible set in the form of a linear constraint, they 
do not participate in the optimisation process, in that potential improvements in deposits are not 
considered. 

























𝜏   
 
6 We have also run the analysis using the ideal reference point definitions as in Asmild et al. (2016). While some 
differences were observed in the resulting values of productivity change, the conclusions of the paper were not 








𝜏  −𝑟 = 1,… 𝑟 − 1, 𝑟 + 1,…𝑞  





𝜏), DMU 𝑜 is technically efficient. Otherwise, the potential improvements in 
each input and output in the direction of (𝒙𝑜
∗,𝜏, 𝒚𝑜
∗,𝜏) will be identified in the second stage of MEA. The 
relevant linear programs are presented below for the contemporaneous distance function (left panel) 
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𝜏) the respective cross-period efficiency in the direction of the ideal reference point 
defined earlier. Given the definitions above and replacing the directional distance functions in (6) with 













































It is important to note that we have defined the MEA-Malmquist index so that values exceeding 1 
reflect progress in the index or its components, values less than 1 reflect regress, while values equal to 
1 indicate no change. That is, instead of replacing the distance functions with their reciprocal efficiency 
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scores, we did a direct substitution to obtain more tractable interpretations on productivity change that 
will be also useful for our beta convergence regressions.  
We provide a graphical illustration of the relevant concepts in Figure 1 below. To enable graphical 
exposition, we use two inputs and one output under the assumption of input orientation, meaning 
𝑔𝜏(𝑦𝑟
𝜏) = 0. The pivoting of the isoquant is introduced to emphasize the failure of radial models in 
capturing uneven technical change, further motivating the use of directional distance functions and 
models such as the MEA-Malmquist index used here. In Figure 1, the productivity of input 𝑥1 declines 
from period 𝑡 to period 𝑡 + 1, whereas the productivity of input 𝑥2 increases. For the calculation of the 





respect to the frontier in time 𝑡 or 𝑡 + 1. That is, we need to consider either the green arrows pointing 
towards the ideal reference point (𝑥𝑜
∗,𝑡 , 𝑦𝑜
∗,𝑡), or the red arrows towards (𝑥𝑜
∗,𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑜
∗,𝑡+1). Graphically, 
productivity increase is observed when the arrows stemming from (𝑥𝑜
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑜
𝑡+1) are shorter than their 
counterparts. Efficiency increase is observed when the red arrow from (𝑥𝑜
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑜
𝑡+1) is shorter than the 
green arrow from (𝑥𝑜
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑜
𝑡). Technical progress, that considers the relative distance of the frontiers from 
a reference DMU, is observed when the green arrows are shorter than the red arrows that stem from the 
same point. Finally, to graphically identify the potential improvements for each input, we would need 













Figure 1. Multidirectional productivity change 
 
Notes: The figure provides a graphical illustration of the multidirectional productivity change for the case of two 
inputs and one output. We consider 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑜 operating in periods 𝑡 (𝑥𝑜
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑜
𝑡) and 𝑡 + 1 (𝑥𝑜
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑜
𝑡+1), respectively. 
The two isoquants reflect combinations of the two inputs required to produce output quantity 𝑐 in both periods. 
The green arrows show the potential improvements with respect to the frontier at time 𝑡 in the direction of the 
ideal reference point (𝑥𝑜
∗,𝑡 , 𝑦𝑜
∗,𝑡). Similarly, the red arrows reflect the potential improvements with respect to the 




3.3. Multidirectional conditional convergence 
We propose a novel approach for testing dimension-specific, 𝛽-convergence in productivity, 
efficiency and technology. Our paper is closest to Casu et al. (2016), Degl’Innocenti et al. (2017) and 
Fujii et al. (2018), but with the following differences, at least in joint consideration: (i) we examine 
convergence in productivity and its decompositions, rather than in the growth rate of the respective 
measures, (ii) we introduce in this context the notion of convergence in technology, (iii) we apply our 
convergence analysis on each input and output separately, and (iv) we examine for conditional 
convergence. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose such definitions of convergence and 
their theoretical justifications are offered below.  
Productivity 
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Considering the two building blocks of productivity change in (3) and (4) and technical change in 
(9) and (10), the concept of change is embedded in the ratios. In particular, (3) and (4) examine the 
change in the distance of a DMU in the two time periods from a certain reference technology, while (9) 
and (10) consider the change in the distance of a fixed DMU from the two reference technologies. With 
regards to Figure 1, productivity change can be illustrated by the change in the length of the same-
coloured vectors, while technical change is associated with the change in the length of the vectors 
stemming from each reference DMU. Finally, efficiency change is simply the change in the distance of 
each DMU from the respective frontier.  
We can now provide a technical definition of the concepts of convergence in productivity, efficiency 
and technology, introduced in section 1. In this context, absolute convergence is achieved when the 
respective vectors for all DMUs are of the same length; a condition that could be theoretically satisfied 
in the long run if all DMUs lie on the same frontier. Regarding productivity convergence, this requires 
that less productive firms exhibit a greater productivity growth than more productive ones. Considering 
(3), this suggests that firms that initially exhibit a relatively high level of inefficiency (?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)), 
will need to ensure that they close up in the future the distance (?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)). In fact, inefficient 
firms will need to make greater leaps in productivity (?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) − ?⃗? 
𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔)) to be able to 
catch up with the more productive firms, while similar arguments can be made using period 𝑡 + 1 as 
the reference technology. If these conditions are all met and thus firms converge in productivity, in the 
long-run banks will be on a balanced growth path, suggesting convergence in the growth rate of 
productivity as well; that is, converge towards the value of one for the MEA-Malmquist index in each 
dimension.7 This provides a link between the concepts introduced here with previous studies on 
convergence in productivity change. 
 
7 If absolute convergence is achieved, then ?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) = ?⃗? 
𝑡(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔) and ?⃗? 
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) =
?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔), which is the case of no productivity change. 
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Taking natural logarithms in equation (5) and replacing the distance functions with the directional 
efficiency measures in the way discussed in the previous section, we have for the input or output 
variable 𝑑:  





𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡) − ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) + ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡+1)
− ln 𝜃𝑑







Considering reference technology 𝑡, it would be possible to test for convergence in dimension-𝑑 
productivity as follows: 
ln𝑀𝑑
𝑡 = ln𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡) − ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) + 𝜀 (16) 
Similarly, and without change in the notation of regression coefficients for ease of exposition, it is 




𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡+1) − ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡+1)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡+1) + 𝜀 
(17) 
To avoid discriminating against a reference period, we test for convergence in productivity on the 
average of (16) and (17):  
ln𝑀𝑑(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) + ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡+1)
2
+ 𝜀 (18) 
Efficiency convergence is tested using the usual approach in the literature: 
ln 𝐸𝐶 = ln𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡+1) − ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡) + 𝜀 (19) 
Finally, we use the same logic as with convergence in productivity to test for convergence in 
technology. The key difference here is that the concept of convergence intuitively involves the extent 
to which the two frontiers close in towards a specific DMU. Considering (10) we can deduce that firms 
that have a relatively large distance from their frontier in a certain year (?⃗? 𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)) compared 
to the previous period’s reference technology(?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)) will need to catch up faster with the 
frontier shift in order to reduce the technological gap (?⃗? 𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔) − ?⃗? 
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔)) from 
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the firms leading change. Similar arguments could be made when DMU (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) is used as reference. 
From equations (9) and (10) and following the same steps as with the case of productivity convergence 
above, we can test for convergence in technology as follows:  
ln 𝑇𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡; 𝑔𝑡+1) + ln 𝜃𝑑
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑔𝑡+1)
2
+ 𝜀 (20) 
In the regression specifications (18) to (20) above, a negative and statistically significant value for 
𝛽1 is evidence of absolute 𝛽-convergence in the respective component and dimension of productivity. 
It is also possible to test for conditional convergence, that is, convergence towards different 
equilibria, in the presence of exogenous influences. To account for conditional convergence, we extend 
regression models (18) to (20) by including the natural logarithms of the Liquid Assets Ratio and the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio. If 𝛽1 is negative and statistically significant and 𝛽2 is statistically significant, 
irrespective of sign, there is evidence of conditional convergence. In the context of banking, for 
successful integration we would prefer evidence of absolute convergence rather than conditional 
convergence, in that banks would converge towards a common frontier, instead of local equilibria that 
may depend on the level of their liquidity and capital adequacy.  
 
4. Empirical findings  
We now present the empirical findings arising from the multidirectional productivity change and the 
estimation of (conditional) 𝛽-convergence for SSM-supervised banks, discussed in subsections 4.1 and 
4.2, respectively. Policy implications are discussed in subsection 4.3. 
 
4.1 Multidirectional productivity change 
The results on multidirectional productivity change are presented in Figure 2 and Table 2 below. 
Figure 2 plots the productivity, efficiency and technical change between consecutive time periods 
during 2011 to 2017 for an ‘Average Bank’.8 We find substantial asymmetries in the productivity 
 
8 The Average Bank is an artificial unit and its inputs and outputs correspond to the average values in each 
respective dimension. This representation captures the average behaviour in the banking sector and is less prone 
to outliers compared to averaging across banks' efficiency scores. Moreover, results are not affected since the 
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behaviour of the SSM-supervised banks across dimensions. First, while productivity change appears 
overall stable around 1, the opposite is true for its two components. In particular, we find that the 
efficiency improvements that we observe across dimensions are counterbalanced by an equivalent 
decline in technology. Although the former could be interpreted as evidence of improved managerial 
practices, we cannot exclude the possibility that the operations of most banks remained largely 
unchanged and that the improvements in efficiency were due to the inward shifting frontier. Second, 
the most notable change in behaviour is observed between periods 2013-2014 (point 2013) and 2014-
2015 (point 2014), coinciding with the period after the creation of the SSM. Finally, while banks 
produce on average similar results for the different dimensions, Other Earning Assets, that mainly 
include banks’ investment activities, exhibit substantial differences, reflecting the multidimensional 
nature of banking operations. We also observe a substantial dip in performance in Other Earning Assets 
after 2013 compared to other variables, suggesting that changes in regulation and supervision can have 
an asymmetric impact on bank productivity. 
 




Average Bank is always enveloped within the frontier, by definition (Siriopoulos and Tziogkidis, 2010; Tziogkidis 
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Efficiency Change Technical Change 
Notes: The figures plot the MEA-Malmquist index for each input and output dimension (top), and for its 
decomposition into efficiency change (bottom left) and technical change (bottom right). Each patterned line 
corresponds to a dimension specified on the legend on the top of the figure. Results presented for a given year 
reflect values of the index from that year to the next one. For example, the MEA-Malmquist index on NPLs for 
the period 2013 to 2014 can be traced by the position of the solid black line on the top line plot in the position 
‘2013’. Values greater, equal to, or less than one, indicate an increase, no change, or decline, in the respective 
component. Analytical results for all banks in the sample are provided in the accompanying Supplement. 
 
Given the significance of our results and to further investigate the extent to which 2013 is associated 
with a substantial change in the behaviour of financial institutions in utilising their resources, we have 
estimated the MEA-Malmquist index for the whole period (2011-2017), as well as for the two sub-
periods around 2013 (2011-2013 and 2013-2017). It is important to note that this is a different type of 
analysis than simply averaging over the respective periods, since the focus is on the relative position of 
the respective frontiers. For the remainder of the paper we focus our analysis on these periods, while 
analytical results for annual changes can be found in the accompanying Supplement. 
Table 3 below presents the productivity change and its decompositions for the Average Bank during 
the aforementioned periods of interest. From 2011 to 2017 the frontier shifts inwards, partly attributed 
to the imposition of additional controls and supervision from the ECB. At the same time, efficiency 
appears improved, either due to improvements in managerial practices, or due to the inward 
displacement of the frontier. After the creation of the SSM, these effects are more pronounced, 
especially for Other Earning Assets, potentially attributed to stricter requirements for investment asset 
quality and capital adequacy. Considering also Table 1, this can be confirmed by the decreasing average 
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slowdown in technical regress for Net Loans and NPLs, on the one hand, can be attributed to the 
gradually improving credit conditions is Europe. On the other hand, it is indicative of actions that banks 
are required to take towards improving asset quality, which is consistent with the decreasing NPLs and 
the increasing Net Loans we observe in Table 1. 
 
Table 2. Multidirectional productivity change for the Average Bank before and after 2013 
  Fixed Assets 
Staff 
Expenses 




2011 - 2017           
Productivity Change 0.976 1.013 0.973 1.013 0.938 
Efficiency Change 1.201 1.201 1.185 1.506 1.651 
Technical Change 0.813 0.844 0.822 0.673 0.568 
       
2011 - 2013      
Productivity Change 0.994 1.007 0.978 0.925 0.875 
Efficiency Change 1.088 1.071 1.101 1.278 1.144 
Technical Change 0.914 0.941 0.889 0.723 0.765 
       
2013 - 2017      
Productivity Change 0.982 0.994 0.979 1.035 0.985 
Efficiency Change 1.104 1.122 1.077 1.178 1.443 
Technical Change 0.890 0.886 0.909 0.878 0.683 
Notes: The table presents the MEA-Malmquist index of productivity change for each dimension for the whole 
period of study, as well for the period before the introduction of the SSM (2011-2013) and after (2013-2017). The 
reported figures correspond to an average bank, the inputs and outputs of which are the average values in the 
respective dimension. 
 
4.2. Convergence analysis 
The results for our 𝛽-convergence analysis are summarised in Figures 3 to 5 and Tables 3 to 5 below. 
The figures present the kernel densities for the contemporaneous and cross-period efficiencies that 
participate in the calculation of the MEA-Malmquist index and its components.9 Each figure contains 
density plots for the contemporaneous and cross-period efficiency distributions that comprise the 
respective productivity components.  
In each dimension, a displacement of the red line(s) to the right towards the same-patterned black 
line(s) indicates an improvement in the respective dimension. From a regulator’s perspective, it would 
 
9 Density plots for each component, dimension and time period are provided in the accompanying Supplement. 
22 
 
be desirable for the red-line densities to move towards the black ones. Such movements would reflect 
an overall improvement in the utilisation of resources (positive efficiency change) and the 
implementation of regulations which not only do they secure the stability of the financial system, but 
also are conducive to the adoption of financial innovations and technologies or practices that improve 
the productivity of banks and hence reduce the costs of financial intermediation (technical progress). 
Moreover, narrower distributions (and ideally towards 1) imply convergence in the practices followed 
by commercial banks, while widening distributions suggest divergence due to the increased volatility 
and therefore uncertainty of operations. Therefore, narrowing and shifting distributions towards 1 
provide a desirable behavioural pattern which would imply homogeneity, stability and efficient use of 
resources. 
Considering the behaviour of densities in the figures below we find substantial differences in the 
shape and position of the dimensional distributions and their components. This suggests that 
disaggregating productivity change per component and dimension can reveal asymmetries that would 
otherwise not be possible to examine. Regarding productivity change from 2011 to 2017, we do not 
obtain a clear picture about the direction and width of distributions, attributed to the almost mirror 
results obtained with respect to the two reference technologies. This is in line with the results for the 
Average Bank in Table 2 where productivity change is close to 1 in all dimensions. The clearest pattern 
emerging is that the distributions for Other Earning Assets become flatter, implying increasing variation 
and heterogeneity in investment-related operations. When considering the two sub-periods, we obtain 
similar results, in that the changes in the shape and position of densities is marginal. The only difference 
we observe is that the aforementioned flattening of the distributions for Other Earning Assets is mainly 
observed after the creation of the SSM.  
With regards to the decompositions of the productivity index, we confirm our earlier finding that 
efficiency has improved across dimensions and that the frontier has substantially shifted inwards. 
Indeed, most efficiency distributions exhibit a clear rightward motion, while most densities associated 
with technical change have moved in the opposite direction. However, in some cases the behaviour of 
the Average Bank (Table 2) is not entirely reflected on the behaviour of densities, which is attributed 
to the skewness of the associated distributions. For example, the component densities only marginally 
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move for Fixed Assets and Impaired Loans, although we would expect a clearer picture in relation to 
Table 2.  
An important insight we gain by inspecting the figures below, is that, apart from the differences in 
magnitude we found earlier for the different decompositions and dimensions, we also observe that 
certain dimensions are associated with more variability compared to others. In particular, both outputs 
are associated with substantially flatter distributions compared to their inputs. This suggests that banks 
are more heterogeneous in their operations with respect to credit and investment operations, rather than 
on their control of staff and capital expenses. Regarding Impaired Loans, we find that their distributions 
are quite leptokurtic and unimodal, which is indicative of common managerial practices and technology 
in that dimension, attributed to common supervision and regulatory requirements in the management 
and reporting of NPLs. There are still banks that deviate considerably from the centre of the distribution, 
which means that, although impaired loans are treated similarly, the degree of risk tolerance can vary.  
A notable observation is that the aforementioned flattening in the second period for Other Earning 
Assets, is mainly spotted in the respective efficiency distributions. This implies that the variability in 
the investment-related operations is mainly attributed to changes in managerial practices, potentially in 
response to the stricter controls imposed that limited the investment activities of banks and which is 
reflected in the inward shift of the frontier. 
 
Figure 3. Kernel densities of contemporaneous and cross-period efficiencies: 2011-2017 
Productivity Change Efficiency change Technical Change 
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Notes: The figure plots the kernel densities of the efficiencies and cross-period efficiencies used in the calculation 
of productivity change (first column), efficiency change (column 2) and technical change (column 3) for each 
input and output dimension as indicated on the axes of the plots in each row. The time periods considered are 








Figure 4. Kernel densities of contemporaneous and cross-period efficiencies: 2011-2013 
Productivity Change Efficiency change Technical Change 
   
   
   
   
   
Notes: Please refer to the notes of Figure 3. 
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Figure 5. Kernel densities of contemporaneous and cross-period efficiencies: 2013-2017 
Productivity Change Efficiency change Technical Change 
   
   
   
   
   




The results for the absolute and conditional 𝛽-convergence tests are presented in Tables 3 to 5 below, 
for each period considered. Each table is split in column-wise sections that present results for 
convergence in productivity, efficiency and technology, while the three horizontal sections correspond 
to the absolute and conditional convergence tests. With the exception of Net Loans, we find strong 
evidence of absolute convergence in productivity in all dimensions, indicated by the negative and 
statistically significant slope coefficients. Considering the two decompositions, although efficiency 
converge is observed across dimensions, the convergence in technology is only statistically significant 
for Fixed Assets, Staff Expenses and NPLs.  
Including the Liquid Assets Ratio (LAR) or the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in our convergence 
regressions does not produce any statistically significant results and, therefore, the hypothesis of 
conditional convergence cannot be accepted in this context. This suggests that there is evidence of 
convergence towards a common frontier, which is not influenced by the level of liquidity and capital 
adequacy that banks maintain. The fact that banks do not converge towards local equilibria and have a 
common direction instead, is evidence supportive of integration in the European banking sector. 
  
Table 3. Beta convergence results for the period 2011-2017 
2011-2017 
Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.549*** -1.179***     -0.129** -0.284**     -0.506*** -1.080***   
Staff Expenses -0.330*** -1.084***     -0.044 -0.374**     -0.261*** -0.646***   
NPLs -0.464*** -0.920***     -0.173*** -0.392***     -0.346*** -0.670***   
Net Loans -0.043 -0.010     0.080 -0.254***     -0.259*** 0.077   
Other Earn.  
Assets -0.321*** -0.323***     -0.078 -0.452***     -0.526*** 0.030   
                        
Liquid Assets 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.632*** -1.194*** 0.029   -0.094 -0.272** -0.011   -0.596*** -1.095*** 0.032 
Staff Expenses -0.231 -1.027*** -0.031   0.103 -0.334** -0.051   -0.211** -0.628*** -0.017 
NPLs -0.312 -0.910*** -0.056   -0.139 -0.377*** -0.010   -0.279 -0.671*** -0.025 
Net Loans -0.162 -0.001 0.047   0.223 -0.258*** -0.055   -0.530*** 0.108 0.107** 
Other Earn.  
Assets 0.017 -0.267*** -0.109   0.371 -0.386*** -0.138   -0.878*** -0.023 0.120* 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.589*** -1.186*** 0.004   -0.082 -0.261** -0.004   -0.566*** -1.087*** 0.006 
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Staff Expenses -0.302*** -1.057*** -0.002   -0.007 -0.358** -0.003   -0.225*** -0.618*** -0.003 
NPLs -0.430*** -0.912*** -0.003   -0.183** -0.396*** 0.001   -0.313** -0.664*** -0.003 
Net Loans -0.083 -0.009 0.004   0.125 -0.251*** -0.005   -0.352*** 0.085 0.010 
Other Earn.  
Assets -0.206 -0.306*** -0.011   0.096 -0.428*** -0.015   -0.634*** 0.019 0.011 
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients for absolute 𝛽-convergence in the upper section, and conditional 𝛽-
convergence in the middle and bottom sections, for each input-output dimension. The results for convergence in productivity, in 
efficiency and in technology are organised in the three vertical sections, indicated by the respective headings. Three stars (***), 
two stars (**) and one star (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Analytical results for 
each adjacent time period can be found in the accompanying Supplement.  
 
Table 4 below presents the results for the period before 2013. Contrary to the full period, we do not 
find evidence of productivity convergence for Other Earning Assets or efficiency convergence for the 
two inputs, while for the case of technology the results are similar. Since there is evidence of 
convergence in technology for Fixed Assets and Staff Expenses, we deduce that the convergence in 
productivity observed for inputs during 2011-2013 is mainly driven by technological change, albeit 
towards a lower level. Regarding outputs, convergence is only found for the case of efficiency change, 
while for NPLs we find evidence of convergence in all elements.  
Considering conditional convergence, we find substantially different results compared to the full 
period. In particular, we find many instances where the coefficients for both the exogenous regulatory 
variables (𝛽3) and the slope coefficients in convergence regressions (𝛽2) are statistically significant at 
the same time. Additional liquidity seems to facilitate productivity growth in NPLs, mainly through its 
effect on technical change. Moreover, liquidity has a positive influence on the efficiency change for Net 
Loans and a negative one for Other Earning Assets.10 The implication arising is that, while additional 
liquidity has induced banks to become more efficient in extending loans, it has a deceleration effect in 
the efficiency convergence for investments, suggesting complementarity between the two outputs. At 
the same time, greater liquidity seems to be associated with technical progress in NPLs, indicating that 
banks do not necessarily use their additional liquidity to provide loans to riskier customers. Our findings 
 
10 It is useful to remind the readers that the dependent variables used to test for convergence in productivity, 
efficiency and technology in equations (18) to (20) are the natural logarithms of the Malmquist index of 
productivity change and its decomposition into efficiency change and technical change, respectively.  
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suggest that, during 2011-2013, different levels of liquidity tend to induce banks to converge towards 
different equilibria instead of a common one.  
Considering capital adequacy, we also find strong evidence of conditional convergence in 
productivity (for the two inputs and NPLs), in efficiency (for Staff Expenses, NPLs and Net Loans), as 
well as in technology (for Fixed Assets and NPLs). Therefore, the conditional convergence in 
productivity for the two inputs is mainly driven by technology for Fixed Assets and efficiency for Staff 
Expenses. While there is no straightforward implication arising from this observation, it could be argued 
that better capitalised banks also take care in controlling their inputs. Notably, for the case of NPLs, 
capital adequacy has a positive influence not only on productivity growth, but for the two 
decompositions as well. This implies that banks with a higher Capital Adequacy Ratio tend to improve 
the management of their NPLs and at the same time expand the frontier in doing so. Given the results 
in Table 2, we could argue that, on average, the improvement in the efficiency of NPLs was driven by 
well-capitalised banks, whereas the technological decline in NPLs was mainly driven by less-capitalised 
banks. On the one hand, this can imply that undercapitalised banks take on additional risks in extending 
credit to higher risk customers. On the other hand, it could suggest that we are merely capturing a 
reverse causality effect, in that banks suffering losses and high levels of NPLs due to the debt crisis, are 
also relatively undercapitalised, which has been a valid observation for the banking systems of the 
southern EU economies at the time. Finally, taking also into account the positive effect of capital 
adequacy on the efficiency growth of Net Loans, we could deduce that well-capitalised banks try to 
maximise the value of their loan portfolios, while minimising their exposure to NPLs, which is evidence 
of risk aversion. 
 
Table 4. Beta convergence results for the period 2011-2013 
2011-2013 
Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.373*** -0.793***     0.025 -0.037     -0.391*** -0.775***   
Staff Expenses -0.231*** -0.732***     0.029 -0.072     -0.259*** -0.712***   
NPLs -0.359*** -0.803***     0.024 -0.139**     -0.404*** -0.777***   
Net Loans -0.072 -0.118     0.059* -0.294***     -0.240*** 0.035   
Other Earn.  
Assets 
-0.087 -0.103     0.016 -0.210***     -0.251*** 0.004   
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Liquid Assets 
Ratio 
β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.439*** -0.805*** 0.023   0.020 -0.038 0.002   -0.450*** -0.786*** 0.021 
Staff Expenses -0.313*** -0.741*** 0.030   -0.011 -0.084 0.014   -0.320*** -0.719*** 0.022 
NPLs -0.563*** -0.834*** 0.073**   -0.043 -0.168** 0.020   -0.593*** -0.806*** 0.068** 
Net Loans -0.345*** -0.074 0.111***   -0.065 -0.292*** 0.047*   -0.421*** 0.061 0.072 
Other Earn.  
Assets 
0.347 -0.039 -0.136*   0.444* -0.148** -0.131*   -0.447** -0.022 0.064 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.504*** -0.804*** 0.013***   0.004 -0.046 0.002   -0.514*** -0.787*** 0.013** 
Staff Expenses -0.319*** -0.751*** 0.009**   -0.030 -0.094* 0.005***   -0.314*** -0.728*** 0.005 
NPLs -0.506*** -0.821*** 0.015***   -0.064 -0.175*** 0.008***   -0.512*** -0.793*** 0.011** 
Net Loans -0.140* -0.123 0.007   -0.059 -0.300*** 0.012***   -0.188* 0.048 -0.005 
Other Earn.  
Assets 
-0.039 -0.097 -0.004   0.034 -0.208*** -0.002   -0.266** 0.003 0.001 
Notes: Please refer to the notes of Table 3. 
 
When considering the post-2013 period, we find that results differ substantially compared to the 
preceding period. First, the estimated coefficients for absolute 𝛽-convergence vary in magnitude and 
significance, but overall there is stronger evidence of convergence. In particular, convergence is 
additionally found in the productivity of Other Earning Assets, in the efficiency of the two inputs and 
in the technology of Net Loans. However, the efficiency convergence coefficient for the latter turns 
insignificant, indicating that banks have shifted focus from the management of Net Loans to the 
approach they follow in converting their inputs into loans. 
The results on conditional convergence are also substantially different. Contrary to the previous 
period, after the creation of the SSM there are significantly fewer cases where the hypothesis of 
conditional convergence is confirmed. Especially for LAR, conditional convergence is only observed 
in two instances as opposed to four previously, while for CAR we find only three cases as opposed to 
eight. This suggests that after 2013 there is rather evidence of absolute convergence towards a common 
frontier, instead of conditional convergence towards local equilibria.  
Liquidity has a negative effect on productivity growth for Staff Expenses and a positive effect on 
technological growth for Net Loans. The latter can be attributed to the quantitative easing programme 
that the ECB announced in March 2015, which improved not only liquidity, but also the “technology” 
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of credit extension. The implication here is that promoting liquidity in the market and ensuring broad 
access to these funds, is conducive to integration.  
Regarding capital adequacy, we find evidence of conditional convergence in efficiency for NPLs 
and Other Earning Assets, while convergence in technology is found for Net Loans. However, there is 
no evidence for conditional convergence in productivity in any dimension. The positive influence of 
capital adequacy on the technological growth of Net Loans indicates that, after 2013, better capitalised 
banks exhibit higher rates of technical growth in generating loans. Moreover, these banks also tend to 
experience lower rates of growth in the efficiency of managing their impaired loans or investments, 
given the negative impact on the growth rate of efficiency on NPLs and Other Earning Assets. A 
potential explanation is that banks may maintain high capital adequacy at the expense of expanding 
investments, in that they become more selective with the quality of investments due to the narrow Tier1 
capital definitions. They therefore switch to loan operations, and given the additional liquidity 
stemming from ECB’s QE programme, they inevitably end up including in their loan portfolios riskier 
customers.  
 
Table 5. Beta convergence results for the period 2013-2017 
2013-2017 
Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.452*** -1.020***     -0.121** -0.195*     -0.367*** -0.875***   
Staff Expenses -0.157*** -0.500***     -0.039 -0.254*     -0.137*** -0.310***   
NPLs -0.268*** -0.656***     -0.197*** -0.313***     -0.135* -0.479***   
Net Loans -0.037 -0.093     -0.043 -0.117     -0.115*** -0.294***   
Other Earn.  
Assets 
-0.273*** -0.227***     -0.117 -0.346***    -0.376*** -0.042   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.545*** -1.044*** 0.032   -0.112 -0.191* -0.003   -0.452*** -0.897*** 0.029 
Staff Expenses 0.043 -0.368** -0.064**   0.094 -0.190 -0.044*   -0.071 -0.284*** -0.023 
NPLs -0.259 -0.656*** -0.003   -0.196* -0.312*** 0.000   -0.183 -0.481*** 0.018 
Net Loans -0.095 -0.096 0.022   0.162 -0.090 -0.075*   -0.353*** -0.284*** 0.093*** 
Other Earn.  
Assets 
-0.430** -0.249*** 0.053   -0.162 -0.352*** 0.015   -0.664*** -0.083 0.100** 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.237 -1.006*** -0.077   0.327 -0.139 -0.155**   -0.367 -0.875*** 0.000 
Staff Expenses 0.129 -0.447*** -0.100   0.238 -0.215 -0.097   -0.094 -0.305*** -0.016 
NPLs 0.198 -0.631*** -0.166   0.194 -0.254** -0.135*   0.038 -0.472*** -0.062 
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Net Loans -0.308 -0.095 0.099   0.323 -0.101 -0.132   -0.739*** -0.289*** 0.230** 
Other Earn.  
Assets 
-0.087 -0.230*** -0.069   1.088** -0.343*** -0.440***   -1.575*** 0.005 0.451*** 
Notes: Please refer to the notes of Table 3. 
 
4.3 Policy implications 
There are important implications arising from our analysis which may be useful to policy makers. 
First, the fact that SSM-supervised banks exhibit, in principle, efficiency improvements, though 
technological deterioration, indicates that although banks use their resources more efficiently, they have 
fewer options to do so. Technical regress in banking has been linked with the imposition of prudential 
regulations and managerial controls, effectively rising the costs of financial intermediation (Tziogkidis 
et al., 2018). The higher costs may be passed on to the consumers. In addition, banks would need to 
operate under narrow profit margins, mainly by exploiting economies of scale. This could eventually 
induce consolidation in the banking sector, as the smaller banks would find it difficult to compete with 
the bigger ones, deteriorating the competitiveness in the sector. Given the above, our analysis indicates 
that policy makers should provide commercial banks with incentives for innovation, while maintaining 
a healthy level of regulatory insight.  
 Second, we find substantial asymmetries in the behaviour of the element-wise productivity and its 
decompositions. In particular, despite the fact that the banks included in our sample exhibit similar 
operational characteristics, the variability observed in the distributions in most dimensions considered 
is indicative of heterogeneities attributable to differences in technology across banking sectors (Bos and 
Schmiedel, 2007; Kontolaimou et al., 2012), or due to other country-specific factors. For example, some 
banks seem to be less risk averse, given their approach with respect to NPLs, while others are more risk 
averse and therefore extend credit more cautiously. Similarly, the degree of investment activities and 
the related risk exposures can also vary substantially among banks. This also highlights the need to 
examine productivity by dimension and component rather than on an aggregated level, in order to 
identify key areas for improvement and policy intervention. Therefore, it is recommended that policy 
takes into account the country-level or bank-specific characteristics, and exercises control in a more 
discretional way rather than following an “one-size-fits-all” type of policy. The ECB could identify the 
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specific regulatory and supervisory tasks which could be undertaken locally, in order to implement 
tailored controls that would promote faster convergence and integration. 
Third, we find strong evidence of conditional convergence with respect to liquidity, one of the 
fundamental resources for the extension of loans and which has been increasingly scarce due to the debt 
crisis in Europe. Before the creation of the SSM, we find that liquidity is conducive to convergence in 
loans and NPLs, while after 2013, and due to the QE programme of the ECB, additional liquidity seems 
to facilitate technical growth in loans. This suggests that liquidity plays an important role for growth 
and that maintaining a common level across banks is conducive to integration. We therefore argue that 
the implementation of the minimum liquidity coverage ratio in 2014 by the ECB, in line with the 
recommendations of Basel III, facilitates integration. However, the exclusion of systemic banks from 
the QE programme of the ECB during the European debt crisis impedes the integration process and, 
therefore, alternative mechanisms need to be explored. 
Finally, similar arguments can be made about capital adequacy, which is also of regulatory 
significance and of high importance in maintaining financial stability. Well-capitalised banks achieve 
higher rates of performance improvement with respect to loans and NPLs before 2013, whereas after 
the creation of the SSM and the additional regulatory requirements that followed, the influence on NPLs 
on performance is negative while a complementarity effect appears for investments. The implication is 
that the stricter regulatory oversight and controls after 2013 have affected the behaviour of banking 
institutions, which are becoming increasingly careful with the quality of their investment assets. This, 
however, combined with the additional liquidity from the ECB through the QE programme, seems to 
induce additional risk-taking on loans in order to achieve a good rate of return for their shareholders. 
The implication is that the additional regulatory controls and requirements, combined with the extension 
of cheap credit have induced banks to shift riskiness in other directions, which should be taken into 
account by policy makers when implementing reforms. 
Overall, our analysis indicates that European banks have been converging towards a common 
frontier during the period from 2011 to 2017 and that the policy interventions after 2013 have facilitated 
this absolute convergence. However, despite the fact that regulation has enabled integration, this paper 
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The paper examines the productivity and convergence behaviour of the European banks supervised 
directly by the SSM during the period from 2011 to 2017. This period marks the creation of the SSM 
by the ECB, the implementation of regulatory reforms, as well as the European debt crisis, among 
others. We apply a variant of the MEA-Malmquist index of productivity change to estimate the growth 
rate in productivity and its two main components, efficiency change and technical change, for each 
input and output dimension, separately. We then propose a novel approach for measuring and estimating 
𝛽-convergence in each component and dimension of productivity, thereby introducing the notion of 
convergence in technology. Our analysis, therefore, allows examining for behavioural patterns in the 
productivity and convergence of financial institutions for various aspects of their operations. Finally, 
we test for conditional convergence by accounting for the effect of liquidity and capital adequacy on 
convergence behaviour. 
We find that despite the fact that commercial banks have improved significantly their resource 
utilisation (efficiency change) on average, their productive capabilities have deteriorated across inputs 
and outputs (frontier shift). The greatest variability in productivity change is observed for Other 
Earning Assets after 2013, which mainly include investment securities, suggesting that policy changes 
have mostly affected the investment behaviour of banks. Such asymmetric patterns are also observed 
when examining the associated kernel densities which have different shapes across the various 
dimensions and decompositions of productivity, suggesting that banks exhibit substantial variability in 
their operations. We therefore argue that this type of analysis by component and dimension offers 
additional insights in the examination of bank productivity. 
 Our convergence analysis shows that the less productive banks converge across dimensions in at 
least one component of productivity, during the period of study. Moreover, the statistically insignificant 
results on conditional convergence indicate that banks tend to converge towards a common frontier 
rather than local equilibria. However, when considering the two sub-periods the results are substantially 
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different. In particular, while there is strong evidence of conditional convergence with respect to 
liquidity and capital adequacy before 2013, the opposite is true in the following period. We conclude 
that 2013, that marks the creation of the SSM and the imposition of stricter controls and supervision, is 
a breakpoint which enabled absolute convergence. Overall, we argue that the minimum requirements 
on liquidity and capital adequacy implemented after 2013, have enabled the banking sector to move 
towards a common direction and achieve convergence. 
However, there important implications arising from the imposition of additional requirements on 
liquidity and capital adequacy that call for careful consideration in the implementation of such policies. 
Although liquidity is found to facilitate integration, restricting access to QE funds for banks that face 
liquidity constraints due to a crisis, can have a negative impact on bank operations and integration. 
Similarly, strict capital requirements and regulatory capital criteria can induce banks to seek higher 
returns for their shareholders from alternative options that may include loans, hence burdening the 
financial system with more impaired loans. Therefore, while a common level of liquidity and capital 
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The tables and figures below provide analytical results for each bank and each period considered. 
 
Tables S1-S6 present the results on multidirectional productivity change for each bank and each 
adjacent period. The tables report productivity change, efficiency change and technical change for each 
input and output considered. 
 
Figures S1-S18 present the scatterplots for the convergence regressions and associated kernel densities 
for each adjacent period and are split in three columns. The scatterplots of the first column present on 
the vertical axis the left-hand side of equations (18), (19) and (20), as per the indicated figure caption, 
while the horizontal axes include the respective right-hand side. For ease of exposition, we loosely name 
the vertical axes as log efficiency change for the respective input or output and the horizontal axis as 
the associated log efficiency. The red line is the OLS line associated with the respective beta absolute 
convergence regression, while the darker the filling of the dots, the higher the value of the Liquid Assets 
Ratio that is used to test for conditional convergence. The second column presents the same scatterplots 
with the only difference being that the colouring of the markers is according to the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio instead. The third column presents the respective kernel densities and the readers are referred to 
the notes of Figure 3 for more information. 
 
Tables S7-S12 present the results for beta convergence for each adjacent period. For more information 






Table S1. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2011-2012 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
0.96 0.95 0.95 0.93 1.03 1.00 0.99 1.02 0.92 1.23 0.95 0.96 0.94 1.01 0.84 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
0.89 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.87 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.02 0.87 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.86 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.83 1.05 0.66 0.69 0.75 0.61 0.84 1.18 1.14 0.98 1.35 1.25 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
1.19 1.19 1.20 1.07 0.81 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.26 0.95 1.11 1.09 1.11 0.85 0.86 
RCB Bank Ltd 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
1.05 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.00 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.03 1.16 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.87 
Deutsche Bank AG 1.07 1.02 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.93 0.98 1.00 1.32 1.00 
Commerzbank AG 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.93 0.98 1.04 1.06 1.07 0.98 1.12 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.88 
SEB AG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Swedbank As 1.16 1.21 1.20 1.15 0.82 1.09 1.15 1.12 1.40 0.89 1.07 1.05 1.08 0.82 0.91 
AS SEB Pank 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.70 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.05 1.18 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.95 0.59 
Banco Santander SA 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.04 0.98 1.25 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.85 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
0.92 0.94 0.92 0.95 1.02 1.04 1.03 1.04 0.95 1.16 0.88 0.91 0.88 1.00 0.89 
Caixabank, S.A. 0.95 0.96 0.95 1.09 1.26 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.03 1.37 0.87 0.89 0.86 1.05 0.92 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.20 1.56 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.54 0.85 0.85 0.85 1.12 1.01 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.91 0.92 0.91 1.02 1.05 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95 1.24 0.91 0.93 0.90 1.07 0.85 
Bankinter SA 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.94 1.12 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.04 0.81 
Ibercaja Banco SA 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.17 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.48 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.97 0.79 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.69 1.37 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.73 1.82 1.05 1.08 1.04 0.93 0.75 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Danske Bank Plc 1.44 1.20 1.27 1.10 1.95 1.22 1.13 1.42 1.30 1.93 1.18 1.06 0.89 0.85 1.01 
BNP Paribas 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.03 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.92 
Société Générale SA 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.93 1.05 1.11 1.10 1.13 1.08 1.10 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.95 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.99 1.08 1.05 1.08 0.99 1.12 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.97 0.88 
La Banque Postale 0.58 0.36 0.17 3.08 1.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.36 0.17 3.08 1.99 
HSBC France SA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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RCI Banque SA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.12 1.96 1.15 1.11 1.16 1.07 1.91 0.83 0.86 0.82 1.05 1.03 
National Bank of Greece SA 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.08 1.15 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.93 0.92 
Alpha Bank AE 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.43 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.94 1.67 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.85 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 1.06 1.07 1.06 0.96 0.89 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.99 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.97 0.86 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
0.94 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.99 1.09 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.87 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.86 
Citibank Europe Plc 1.30 0.83 1.42 1.41 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.30 0.83 1.42 1.41 0.28 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.87 1.19 0.95 0.98 0.91 1.03 0.80 
UniCredit SpA 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.14 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.88 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.12 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.23 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.91 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.82 1.05 1.02 1.05 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.85 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.81 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.88 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.03 0.96 0.77 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.91 
Banca Carige SpA 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.09 1.23 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.87 
Swedbank AB 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.19 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.14 1.38 1.03 1.01 1.03 0.93 0.87 
AB SEB Bankas 1.15 1.07 1.17 1.05 1.15 1.12 1.07 1.12 1.22 1.25 1.03 0.99 1.05 0.86 0.92 
Luminor Bank AB 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.95 1.20 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.90 1.37 0.91 0.94 0.90 1.05 0.88 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 0.71 0.70 0.89 0.66 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.62 0.95 0.83 0.83 1.01 1.07 0.91 
Swedbank AS 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.80 1.12 1.08 1.14 0.99 0.84 0.90 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.95 
ABLV Bank AS 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.18 1.03 1.06 1.06 1.11 1.30 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.91 
SEB banka AS 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.19 1.09 1.04 1.10 0.96 1.36 0.92 0.95 0.90 1.04 0.87 
Bank of Valletta Plc 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.23 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.83 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.13 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.09 1.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.86 
ING Bank NV 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.93 0.90 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.07 0.82 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.08 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.86 
De Volksbank N.V. 1.15 0.97 0.84 0.97 1.17 1.11 1.05 1.48 1.06 2.44 1.03 0.92 0.57 0.91 0.48 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.27 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.84 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
1.06 1.07 1.06 0.98 1.11 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.01 1.27 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.88 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 1.04 1.03 1.03 0.93 0.84 1.02 1.00 1.03 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.01 0.96 0.84 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.91 0.92 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.94 1.12 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.82 




Table S2. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2012-2013 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
1.21 1.14 1.19 1.07 0.98 1.05 1.07 1.11 1.58 1.12 1.15 1.07 1.07 0.68 0.88 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
1.44 1.15 1.24 1.06 0.96 1.18 1.15 1.19 1.38 1.28 1.22 0.99 1.04 0.77 0.75 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.94 1.37 1.35 1.27 2.63 1.18 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.30 0.79 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
1.03 0.98 1.03 0.94 1.33 0.89 0.90 0.89 1.12 1.92 1.16 1.08 1.15 0.84 0.69 
RCB Bank Ltd 1.00 0.21 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.04 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
1.12 1.12 1.12 0.86 0.70 0.91 0.92 0.91 1.34 0.85 1.24 1.21 1.22 0.65 0.82 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.46 1.00 0.94 0.94 1.00 2.14 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.00 0.68 1.00 
Commerzbank AG 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.91 0.88 0.98 0.99 1.05 1.22 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.74 0.86 
SEB AG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Swedbank As 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.01 0.98 0.95 1.08 1.10 1.31 1.39 1.04 0.92 0.95 0.78 0.71 
AS SEB Pank 1.22 1.12 1.30 1.12 2.07 1.28 1.26 1.59 1.37 4.11 0.95 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.50 
Banco Santander SA 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.84 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.34 1.02 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.71 0.83 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
0.97 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.90 1.02 1.01 1.06 1.23 1.04 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.74 0.87 
Caixabank, S.A. 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.96 0.92 0.99 1.05 0.99 0.84 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.85 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.91 0.93 0.91 1.00 0.71 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.26 0.77 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.79 0.93 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.81 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.29 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.76 0.97 
Bankinter SA 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.76 1.09 1.09 1.15 1.25 0.90 0.84 0.87 0.79 0.77 0.85 
Kutxabank SA 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.98 0.98 1.30 1.00 1.06 1.04 1.03 0.74 0.89 
Ibercaja Banco SA 0.89 0.92 0.88 1.06 1.41 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.28 1.31 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.83 1.08 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 1.39 1.36 1.37 1.07 1.22 1.05 1.11 1.06 1.74 1.38 1.33 1.22 1.29 0.62 0.89 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc 1.31 1.41 0.68 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.31 1.41 0.68 0.94 1.00 
Danske Bank Plc 1.15 1.22 1.09 1.01 1.25 1.05 1.15 1.10 1.02 1.56 1.10 1.06 0.99 0.99 0.80 
BNP Paribas 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.25 1.04 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.76 0.90 
Société Générale SA 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.27 1.07 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.75 0.91 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.27 1.06 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.78 0.91 
La Banque Postale 0.17 0.29 0.14 3.56 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.29 0.14 3.56 0.61 
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HSBC France SA 0.20 2.54 0.66 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 2.54 0.66 1.12 1.00 
RCI Banque SA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.98 0.74 0.92 0.89 0.92 1.04 0.81 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.94 0.91 
National Bank of Greece SA 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 1.14 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.20 1.31 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.78 0.87 
Alpha Bank AE 0.88 0.89 0.88 1.09 1.01 1.10 1.07 1.11 1.35 1.05 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.97 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.02 1.29 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.35 1.36 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.76 0.95 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
1.24 1.26 1.31 1.06 1.21 1.05 1.13 1.09 1.38 1.45 1.18 1.11 1.20 0.77 0.83 
Allied Irish Banks plc 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.05 1.24 1.06 1.13 1.08 1.44 1.40 1.15 1.10 1.16 0.73 0.89 
Citibank Europe Plc 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 0.97 1.03 1.00 0.90 1.18 0.98 1.05 1.04 1.26 1.47 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.71 0.80 
UniCredit SpA 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.89 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.21 1.04 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.76 0.86 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.19 1.09 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.78 0.87 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
1.02 1.08 1.05 0.97 0.95 0.98 1.09 1.02 1.31 1.10 1.04 1.00 1.02 0.74 0.86 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.99 1.00 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.98 1.08 1.07 1.14 1.17 1.01 0.93 0.90 0.82 0.85 
Banca Carige SpA 1.04 1.02 1.02 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.16 1.19 1.03 0.99 1.01 0.79 0.81 
Swedbank AB 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.01 0.63 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.23 0.65 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.82 0.98 
AB SEB Bankas 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.17 0.97 0.99 1.03 0.99 1.37 1.00 1.02 0.97 0.99 0.86 
Luminor Bank AB 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.01 0.97 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.34 1.22 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.75 0.79 
Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.01 0.97 1.07 1.09 1.18 1.58 1.16 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.64 0.84 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 0.70 0.70 0.97 0.46 0.96 1.22 1.22 1.21 4.30 1.12 0.58 0.58 0.80 0.11 0.86 
Swedbank AS 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.45 0.98 1.03 1.06 1.28 0.47 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.97 
ABLV Bank AS 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.89 0.91 0.94 1.21 1.12 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.78 0.89 
SEB banka AS 1.11 1.05 1.21 1.06 1.07 0.99 1.15 1.17 1.43 1.37 1.12 0.91 1.03 0.74 0.78 
Bank of Valletta Plc 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.38 1.12 1.05 1.01 0.98 0.72 0.91 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.02 0.98 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.43 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.02 0.71 0.92 
ING Bank NV 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.07 1.28 1.12 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.74 0.87 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.03 1.02 1.10 1.11 1.34 1.18 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.72 0.87 
De Volksbank N.V. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 1.13 1.08 1.18 1.01 0.82 0.95 1.07 1.09 1.45 1.19 1.20 1.01 1.09 0.69 0.69 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
1.01 1.02 1.01 0.94 0.94 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.33 1.11 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.71 0.84 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 1.06 1.05 1.06 0.82 1.26 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.17 1.54 1.02 1.04 1.01 0.70 0.82 
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Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.39 0.96 0.95 0.98 1.04 1.70 1.04 1.05 1.03 0.69 0.82 
Abanka d.d 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.78 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.96 1.14 1.21 1.03 1.05 1.02 0.69 0.82 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 1.03 0.98 0.98 1.03 1.30 1.18 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.74 0.87 
 
 
Table S3. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2013-2014 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
1.08 1.08 1.09 1.06 0.93 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.08 0.74 1.04 1.03 1.07 0.98 1.25 
Sberbank Europe AG 0.97 0.95 0.98 1.12 1.09 0.93 0.99 0.92 1.02 1.06 1.04 0.96 1.06 1.10 1.03 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
0.79 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.78 0.86 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.23 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 1.05 1.04 1.04 0.97 1.11 0.97 0.98 0.84 0.78 0.86 1.08 1.06 1.25 1.24 1.29 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
1.33 1.30 1.33 1.03 1.23 1.06 1.11 1.05 1.11 1.15 1.25 1.16 1.26 0.93 1.07 
RCB Bank Ltd 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
1.04 1.05 1.04 0.95 1.24 1.06 1.08 1.05 0.99 1.02 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.96 1.22 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.94 0.77 0.86 0.86 0.74 0.88 1.14 1.08 1.08 1.16 1.07 
Commerzbank AG 1.01 1.01 1.04 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.02 0.98 0.94 0.98 1.01 0.99 1.05 1.05 1.08 
SEB AG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Swedbank As 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 0.80 1.07 1.00 1.05 0.99 0.64 0.95 1.01 0.97 1.03 1.26 
AS SEB Pank 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.37 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.27 1.01 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.36 
Banco Santander SA 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.07 1.19 1.00 1.05 0.99 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.96 1.02 1.08 1.13 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
1.01 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.17 1.00 1.04 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.02 0.98 1.04 1.06 1.11 
Caixabank, S.A. 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.06 1.21 1.03 1.09 1.03 1.10 1.04 1.12 1.05 1.13 0.96 1.17 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.02 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.03 1.09 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 1.05 1.02 1.05 0.98 1.45 1.00 1.04 1.00 0.97 1.37 1.05 0.98 1.05 1.01 1.05 
Bankinter SA 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.10 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.05 1.10 
Kutxabank SA 1.05 1.04 1.05 0.99 1.16 1.05 1.07 1.05 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.13 
Ibercaja Banco SA 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.90 0.87 1.08 1.04 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.06 1.11 1.06 1.13 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.04 0.95 1.12 
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Nordea Bank Finland Plc 1.41 0.96 2.12 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.41 0.96 2.12 0.81 1.00 
Danske Bank Plc 1.00 0.98 0.91 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.95 0.83 1.00 0.77 1.00 1.02 1.10 1.00 1.14 
BNP Paribas 0.85 0.90 0.88 0.96 1.03 0.85 0.92 0.83 0.95 0.96 1.01 0.98 1.06 1.01 1.08 
Société Générale SA 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.06 0.84 0.90 0.84 1.02 1.00 1.16 1.09 1.18 0.99 1.06 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.05 0.94 0.99 0.91 1.02 0.97 1.08 1.02 1.12 1.03 1.09 
La Banque Postale 1.87 0.47 0.32 2.11 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.87 0.47 0.32 2.11 1.34 
HSBC France SA 0.52 0.86 1.41 1.27 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.86 1.41 1.27 0.85 
RCI Banque SA 1.91 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.91 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.97 1.07 1.02 1.05 1.02 0.97 0.94 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.14 
National Bank of Greece SA 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.23 1.04 1.09 1.03 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.05 1.12 1.00 1.12 
Alpha Bank AE 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.04 1.11 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.11 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
0.83 0.85 0.80 0.91 0.77 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.66 0.87 0.90 0.83 1.02 1.17 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.79 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.70 0.97 0.96 0.94 1.01 1.13 
Citibank Europe Plc 1.23 2.22 12.95 1.00 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.23 2.22 12.95 1.00 0.47 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.96 1.01 1.14 
UniCredit SpA 1.06 1.06 1.06 0.99 1.18 0.97 1.01 0.95 0.98 1.06 1.10 1.05 1.11 1.01 1.11 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.06 0.91 0.95 0.90 0.98 0.98 1.07 1.03 1.08 1.00 1.08 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
0.87 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.68 0.96 0.99 0.96 1.07 1.11 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.88 0.96 0.84 0.98 0.92 0.89 0.94 0.83 0.98 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.98 
Banca Carige SpA 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.31 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.28 0.91 0.98 0.92 1.01 1.11 
Swedbank AB 1.07 1.03 1.12 1.05 0.76 1.08 1.07 1.13 1.02 0.63 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.20 
AB SEB Bankas 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.48 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.43 1.04 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.11 
Luminor Bank AB 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.07 0.91 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.06 0.71 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.29 
Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.03 0.96 1.09 1.04 0.97 1.00 0.74 0.89 0.93 1.00 1.03 1.29 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 1.36 1.37 1.04 1.79 1.02 0.83 0.88 0.76 0.68 0.84 1.64 1.56 1.37 2.63 1.22 
Swedbank AS 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 2.82 1.03 0.99 1.01 0.91 2.49 0.97 1.01 0.99 1.06 1.13 
ABLV Bank AS 1.10 1.07 1.12 1.16 1.45 1.03 1.05 1.09 0.99 1.26 1.06 1.02 1.03 1.18 1.15 
SEB banka AS 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.45 1.00 0.93 1.01 0.91 0.37 0.96 1.05 0.97 1.01 1.22 
Bank of Valletta Plc 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.99 1.29 1.01 1.02 0.96 0.90 1.08 0.93 0.94 0.96 1.10 1.20 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.54 0.99 1.02 0.97 0.94 1.23 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.04 1.25 
ING Bank NV 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.95 0.99 0.96 1.06 1.19 
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ABN AMRO Bank NV 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.93 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.80 0.81 0.91 0.98 0.94 1.15 1.07 
De Volksbank N.V. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 0.95 1.00 0.88 0.95 1.02 1.07 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.70 0.89 1.01 0.91 1.00 1.46 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
1.08 1.08 1.08 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.08 1.03 1.03 0.86 1.05 1.01 1.05 0.98 1.18 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.01 0.93 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.05 1.09 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 1.07 1.07 1.07 0.93 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.02 0.94 0.95 1.04 1.03 1.05 0.99 1.09 
Abanka d.d 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.67 1.62 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.68 1.51 1.01 1.03 1.03 0.98 1.08 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.06 0.78 1.00 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.68 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.07 1.15 
 
Table S4. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2014-2015 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
1.18 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.04 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.16 1.19 1.06 1.00 1.03 0.99 0.87 
Sberbank Europe AG 1.03 1.04 1.02 0.91 0.77 1.06 1.05 1.09 0.82 0.85 0.97 0.99 0.94 1.11 0.90 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.91 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.03 0.88 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.90 1.00 0.98 1.06 0.88 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.98 1.14 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
0.97 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.57 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.85 0.62 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.12 0.92 
RCB Bank Ltd 0.46 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
1.42 1.27 1.55 1.31 1.54 1.10 1.07 1.28 1.30 2.97 1.29 1.19 1.21 1.00 0.52 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.99 0.98 1.03 1.01 0.93 1.19 1.15 1.04 1.08 1.06 0.83 0.85 0.99 0.93 0.88 
Commerzbank AG 1.07 1.03 1.10 1.02 0.94 1.09 1.05 1.11 0.97 1.08 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.88 
SEB AG 1.00 0.91 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.70 1.00 1.00 
Swedbank As 1.06 1.00 1.03 1.04 0.72 1.01 0.98 1.00 1.02 0.86 1.05 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.84 
AS SEB Pank 1.20 1.17 1.18 1.07 4.93 1.25 1.01 1.09 1.08 4.40 0.96 1.16 1.09 0.99 1.12 
Banco Santander SA 0.96 0.96 0.97 1.02 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 0.87 1.16 0.97 0.96 0.95 1.18 0.84 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
0.93 0.93 0.93 1.10 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.05 0.91 1.06 0.91 0.90 0.89 1.21 0.94 
Caixabank, S.A. 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.84 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.78 1.07 0.91 0.92 0.90 1.23 0.79 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.03 0.98 1.04 0.92 0.89 0.91 1.16 0.94 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.90 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.92 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.88 
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Bankinter SA 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.97 0.94 1.10 0.98 
Kutxabank SA 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.91 1.31 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.07 0.80 
Ibercaja Banco SA 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.26 1.07 1.03 1.05 0.99 0.85 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.69 1.04 1.01 1.05 0.92 0.88 0.90 0.95 0.90 1.04 0.79 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc 2.23 1.11 0.94 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.23 1.11 0.94 0.83 1.00 
Danske Bank Plc 1.25 0.98 0.47 1.02 0.69 1.01 1.05 1.21 1.00 1.30 1.24 0.93 0.39 1.02 0.53 
BNP Paribas 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.93 0.86 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.87 1.03 0.83 0.88 0.87 1.07 0.83 
Société Générale SA 0.80 0.87 0.85 0.99 0.90 1.04 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.06 0.77 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.85 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 0.95 0.97 0.96 1.01 1.08 0.99 1.03 1.03 0.91 1.20 0.96 0.94 0.93 1.11 0.89 
La Banque Postale 2.64 0.63 0.39 1.51 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.64 0.63 0.39 1.51 1.04 
HSBC France SA 0.63 1.11 2.64 1.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.11 2.64 1.23 1.00 
RCI Banque SA 0.41 1.00 1.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 1.00 1.51 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.93 1.19 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.83 1.75 1.10 1.05 1.10 1.12 0.68 
National Bank of Greece SA 1.22 1.21 1.22 0.86 1.11 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.88 1.57 1.22 1.18 1.22 0.97 0.71 
Alpha Bank AE 1.16 1.13 1.16 1.04 1.10 0.98 1.04 0.98 0.98 1.54 1.18 1.09 1.18 1.06 0.72 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.90 1.35 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.11 0.72 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
0.93 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.85 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.92 1.07 0.94 0.94 0.93 1.07 0.80 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.91 1.02 1.04 1.04 0.93 1.14 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.07 0.80 
Citibank Europe Plc 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.85 1.22 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.06 0.79 
UniCredit SpA 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.82 1.16 0.96 0.96 0.95 1.19 0.86 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.90 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.87 1.10 0.91 0.94 0.90 1.11 0.88 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
1.12 1.12 1.12 1.01 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.07 0.92 1.28 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.11 0.86 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.91 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97 1.04 0.91 0.99 0.95 1.01 0.93 
Banca Carige SpA 1.11 1.10 1.11 0.98 1.36 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.92 1.59 1.17 1.11 1.16 1.06 0.85 
Swedbank AB 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.87 1.09 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.13 0.78 
AB SEB Bankas 1.05 1.00 1.04 1.07 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.37 0.97 0.89 0.94 1.00 0.81 
Luminor Bank AB 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.74 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.93 1.92 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.09 0.91 
Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.03 0.86 1.13 0.97 0.96 0.92 1.16 0.88 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 1.00 0.99 1.09 1.10 0.90 0.99 1.09 1.07 1.36 0.88 1.02 0.92 1.02 0.81 1.03 
Swedbank AS 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.50 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.59 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.09 0.84 
ABLV Bank AS 1.14 1.08 1.13 1.26 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.18 1.09 1.54 0.99 0.95 0.95 1.15 0.77 
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SEB banka AS 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.03 0.98 
Bank of Valletta Plc 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.15 1.03 1.03 1.05 0.97 1.35 0.95 0.95 0.93 1.04 0.85 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 1.01 0.97 1.02 0.73 1.19 0.87 0.91 0.87 1.20 0.74 
ING Bank NV 1.23 1.14 1.22 1.26 1.31 1.13 1.16 1.13 1.21 1.52 1.09 0.98 1.08 1.04 0.86 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.04 0.92 1.00 1.03 1.01 0.95 0.99 1.02 0.98 0.99 1.10 0.92 
De Volksbank N.V. 0.89 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.52 0.79 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.27 1.12 1.04 1.12 1.04 1.91 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.86 1.22 0.94 0.95 0.94 1.10 0.78 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 0.91 1.25 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.08 0.80 
Novo Banco 0.48 0.61 0.44 0.73 0.51 0.87 0.78 0.84 0.60 0.43 0.55 0.78 0.52 1.22 1.19 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.01 1.02 1.03 0.86 1.20 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.15 0.81 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.99 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.92 1.31 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.08 0.82 
Abanka d.d 0.82 0.82 0.81 1.32 0.96 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.01 0.78 0.78 0.78 1.33 0.95 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.01 0.95 1.16 0.99 0.96 0.98 1.12 0.86 
Tatra Banka a.s. 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.11 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.07 0.99 1.11 1.00 0.96 0.97 1.11 0.94 
 
 
Table S5. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2015-2016 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
1.05 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.10 1.05 1.09 1.35 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.79 
Sberbank Europe AG 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.23 1.03 1.09 1.04 1.28 1.54 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.79 0.80 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
1.05 1.02 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.44 1.08 1.26 1.12 1.36 0.73 0.95 0.78 0.91 0.74 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.04 0.92 1.25 0.96 0.97 0.93 1.07 0.79 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
0.86 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.69 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.83 
RCB Bank Ltd 1.00 2.55 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.55 0.64 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
0.69 0.77 0.61 0.72 0.61 0.91 0.95 0.79 0.77 0.45 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.93 1.36 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.98 0.99 1.02 0.96 0.98 1.18 1.14 1.12 1.22 1.08 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.78 0.91 
Commerzbank AG 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.03 0.83 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.26 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.88 
SEB AG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S11 
 
Swedbank As 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.22 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.09 1.46 1.00 0.91 1.01 0.95 0.84 
AS SEB Pank 1.03 1.08 1.02 1.01 1.48 1.05 1.16 1.04 1.02 2.18 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.68 
Banco Santander SA 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.07 1.03 1.29 1.21 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.78 0.81 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.89 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.23 1.08 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.79 0.83 
Caixabank, S.A. 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.06 1.08 1.05 1.11 1.05 1.44 1.29 1.05 0.97 1.04 0.74 0.84 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.83 0.95 1.02 0.96 1.09 1.10 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.76 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.87 0.71 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.97 1.02 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.70 
Bankinter SA 0.91 0.93 0.91 1.04 0.81 0.95 1.07 0.96 1.16 1.02 0.96 0.87 0.95 0.90 0.79 
Kutxabank SA 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.02 0.82 0.97 1.08 0.98 1.24 0.99 1.07 0.95 1.07 0.82 0.84 
Ibercaja Banco SA 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.97 1.01 1.06 1.01 1.24 1.15 1.02 0.97 1.02 0.82 0.84 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.04 0.87 0.95 1.06 0.96 1.24 0.98 1.10 0.97 1.09 0.84 0.88 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc 0.70 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Danske Bank Plc 2.17 1.06 0.39 1.05 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.17 1.06 0.39 1.05 0.99 
BNP Paribas 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.96 1.14 1.13 1.18 1.29 1.10 0.79 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.87 
Société Générale SA 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.95 0.92 1.17 1.15 1.18 1.19 1.05 0.70 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.88 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.04 0.86 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.30 1.05 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.80 0.82 
La Banque Postale 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HSBC France SA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
RCI Banque SA 2.26 1.00 3.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.26 1.00 3.41 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 1.22 1.18 1.22 1.10 1.04 1.12 1.20 1.12 1.52 1.16 1.09 0.98 1.09 0.72 0.90 
National Bank of Greece SA 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.00 0.95 1.04 1.09 1.05 1.39 1.12 1.04 0.99 1.04 0.72 0.85 
Alpha Bank AE 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.84 1.02 1.08 1.03 1.22 1.06 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.80 0.79 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 1.01 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.88 1.03 1.08 1.04 1.29 1.03 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.77 0.85 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
0.98 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.95 1.01 1.06 1.04 1.08 1.30 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.73 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.83 1.02 1.07 1.04 1.18 1.04 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.83 0.80 
Citibank Europe Plc 0.20 0.41 0.56 0.71 0.37 0.56 0.60 0.71 0.51 0.63 0.36 0.68 0.80 1.40 0.60 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 1.11 1.08 1.11 1.02 1.21 1.05 1.13 1.09 1.20 1.45 1.05 0.95 1.02 0.85 0.83 
UniCredit SpA 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.92 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.22 1.08 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.75 0.85 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.93 0.96 0.93 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.26 1.22 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.85 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.81 1.01 1.05 1.02 1.23 1.08 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.78 0.75 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.76 0.87 0.74 0.96 0.91 1.37 1.18 1.22 1.11 1.12 0.56 0.74 0.60 0.86 0.81 
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Banca Carige SpA 1.11 1.10 1.10 0.94 0.95 1.14 1.16 1.15 1.22 1.30 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.77 0.73 
Swedbank AB 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.10 0.67 0.93 1.10 0.97 1.29 0.75 1.10 0.92 1.07 0.85 0.89 
AB SEB Bankas 1.09 1.02 1.19 1.06 2.30 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.06 3.81 1.07 0.97 1.13 1.00 0.60 
Luminor Bank AB 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.13 1.01 1.11 1.02 1.25 1.47 1.07 0.94 1.05 0.82 0.77 
Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.31 1.10 1.02 0.97 1.01 0.80 0.94 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 1.45 1.29 1.43 1.00 1.08 1.86 1.62 1.27 2.02 1.39 0.78 0.80 1.12 0.50 0.77 
Swedbank AS 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.06 0.98 1.06 0.98 1.22 1.17 1.01 0.93 1.01 0.84 0.90 
ABLV Bank AS 1.10 1.06 1.13 1.28 0.84 0.91 0.90 0.98 1.32 1.00 1.21 1.19 1.15 0.97 0.84 
SEB banka AS 1.02 0.99 1.07 1.03 2.42 1.02 1.08 1.06 1.12 3.41 1.00 0.92 1.01 0.92 0.71 
Bank of Valletta Plc 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.16 1.04 1.01 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.93 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.06 1.11 1.08 1.61 1.21 1.09 1.03 1.06 0.71 0.95 
ING Bank NV 0.88 0.96 0.90 0.88 0.77 0.94 1.00 0.95 0.99 1.11 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.70 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.90 1.00 1.05 1.01 1.09 1.33 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.68 
De Volksbank N.V. 0.98 0.98 1.06 0.99 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.43 1.03 0.97 1.07 0.99 0.64 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.02 0.92 1.00 1.09 1.00 1.29 1.08 1.08 0.98 1.07 0.79 0.85 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
1.61 1.35 1.54 1.10 1.52 0.93 1.22 0.95 1.52 2.05 1.73 1.10 1.62 0.72 0.74 
Novo Banco 1.17 1.13 1.16 1.01 1.08 1.07 1.12 1.06 1.37 1.29 1.10 1.01 1.09 0.74 0.84 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.02 0.94 1.02 1.05 1.03 1.35 1.05 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.75 0.89 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 0.93 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.96 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.26 1.03 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.93 
Abanka d.d 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.89 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.30 1.03 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.76 0.86 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.10 0.75 0.99 1.10 1.00 1.30 0.87 1.01 0.90 1.00 0.84 0.86 
Tatra Banka a.s. 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.20 1.12 0.96 0.91 0.96 0.84 0.81 
 
 
Table S6. Malmquist productivity change and decompositions for the period 2016-2017 





























Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
0.87 0.96 0.90 1.01 1.45 0.87 0.96 0.82 0.95 1.65 1.00 0.99 1.09 1.06 0.88 
Sberbank Europe AG 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.91 1.37 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.90 1.85 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.02 0.74 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank 
SA/NV 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Banque Degroof Petercam SA 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.12 0.79 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.61 0.65 1.41 1.37 1.40 1.83 1.21 
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Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
1.06 1.08 1.06 0.98 1.43 0.95 1.00 0.94 1.06 1.80 1.12 1.09 1.13 0.93 0.79 
RCB Bank Ltd 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited-
Hellenic Bank Group 
0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.78 1.04 0.89 0.93 0.90 1.06 0.82 
Deutsche Bank AG 1.29 0.97 3.91 0.99 0.34 1.13 1.14 1.01 1.17 1.01 1.14 0.85 3.86 0.85 0.34 
Commerzbank AG 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.94 1.32 1.01 1.02 1.10 1.02 0.76 
SEB AG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Swedbank As 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.03 1.24 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.97 1.55 1.05 1.02 1.17 1.07 0.80 
AS SEB Pank 0.83 1.03 1.44 1.28 0.18 0.67 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.19 1.24 1.11 1.80 1.37 0.95 
Banco Santander SA 0.96 0.96 0.97 1.02 1.08 1.01 0.99 0.97 1.01 1.25 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.01 0.86 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-
BBVA 
1.03 1.02 1.03 0.98 1.05 1.02 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.25 1.01 1.03 1.04 0.95 0.84 
Caixabank, S.A. 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.02 1.16 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.37 0.94 0.96 0.97 1.01 0.84 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.98 1.24 0.94 0.97 0.91 0.97 1.64 1.05 1.04 1.09 1.00 0.76 
Bankinter SA 0.91 0.95 0.92 1.00 1.11 0.94 0.96 0.89 0.94 1.41 0.98 0.99 1.03 1.05 0.79 
Kutxabank SA 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.02 0.89 0.96 0.87 0.96 1.35 1.10 1.04 1.13 1.02 0.76 
Ibercaja Banco SA 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.90 0.86 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.85 1.11 0.88 0.96 0.90 1.06 0.78 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA 0.89 0.94 0.91 1.00 1.36 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.93 1.74 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.07 0.78 
BNP Paribas 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.04 0.98 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.15 1.10 0.94 0.95 1.02 0.90 0.89 
Société Générale SA 0.99 1.03 0.99 0.99 0.95 1.02 1.06 0.93 1.09 1.03 0.97 0.96 1.06 0.91 0.92 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.07 1.11 1.03 1.04 0.97 1.10 1.31 0.99 0.96 1.05 0.97 0.84 
La Banque Postale 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HSBC France SA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
RCI Banque SA 0.77 1.00 1.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.77 1.00 1.22 1.00 1.00 
Piraeus Bank SA 0.86 0.94 0.85 0.89 0.48 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.62 0.95 1.02 0.95 1.01 0.77 
National Bank of Greece SA 0.98 1.01 0.97 0.93 0.67 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.85 1.02 1.04 1.02 0.98 0.79 
Alpha Bank AE 0.98 1.01 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.99 1.14 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.98 0.81 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.81 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.93 1.02 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.02 0.79 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
0.92 0.95 0.93 0.94 1.22 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.90 1.61 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.04 0.76 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.95 1.02 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.89 1.43 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.07 0.71 
Citibank Europe Plc 1.06 0.93 0.74 1.01 0.82 0.93 0.85 0.60 0.76 0.87 1.14 1.09 1.22 1.34 0.94 
Ulster Bank Ireland DAC 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.26 0.96 0.98 0.90 1.00 1.64 1.09 1.05 1.15 1.01 0.77 
UniCredit SpA 1.18 1.16 1.19 1.13 1.15 1.09 1.10 1.07 1.22 1.46 1.09 1.06 1.11 0.92 0.79 
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Intesa Sanpaolo 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.11 1.09 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.96 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
0.99 0.98 0.99 0.88 1.03 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.01 1.08 1.00 1.05 1.01 0.87 0.96 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca 
di Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
0.73 0.83 0.50 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.85 1.02 1.02 0.75 0.86 0.59 0.92 0.87 
Banca Carige SpA 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.91 1.19 0.94 0.89 0.93 1.06 1.28 1.06 1.07 1.06 0.85 0.93 
Swedbank AB 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.02 1.23 0.97 0.98 0.90 0.99 1.34 1.08 1.03 1.18 1.03 0.92 
AB SEB Bankas 1.20 1.05 1.23 1.05 0.92 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.02 0.68 1.18 1.02 1.27 1.03 1.36 
Luminor Bank AB 1.27 0.98 1.24 1.31 0.88 0.98 1.10 0.91 1.14 0.72 1.29 0.89 1.37 1.16 1.21 
Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA 0.94 0.95 0.95 1.03 1.04 0.91 0.94 0.86 0.96 1.29 1.04 1.01 1.11 1.08 0.80 
KBL European Private Bankers SA 0.73 0.61 0.53 0.69 0.69 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.18 0.58 1.89 1.54 0.95 3.81 1.17 
Swedbank AS 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.93 1.17 1.09 1.05 1.15 1.05 0.71 
ABLV Bank AS 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.87 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.94 1.08 0.97 1.04 
SEB banka AS 1.05 1.02 1.04 1.04 0.74 0.93 0.99 0.85 1.00 0.89 1.12 1.03 1.23 1.04 0.84 
Bank of Valletta Plc 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.93 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.82 1.19 0.90 0.95 0.98 1.13 0.84 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.89 1.29 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.02 0.76 
ING Bank NV 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.00 1.14 0.94 0.96 0.87 0.95 1.39 1.04 1.02 1.13 1.05 0.82 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 1.21 1.17 1.22 1.09 1.28 0.97 1.07 0.91 1.16 1.52 1.24 1.10 1.33 0.94 0.84 
De Volksbank N.V. 1.14 1.04 1.18 1.03 1.23 0.99 1.01 0.89 1.00 1.20 1.15 1.03 1.32 1.03 1.03 
Caixa Geral de Depositos 0.96 1.01 0.96 0.91 1.24 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.91 1.68 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.00 0.74 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp 
0.65 0.79 0.66 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.85 0.94 0.79 0.97 0.65 0.92 0.70 1.14 0.82 
Novo Banco 0.96 1.01 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.89 0.95 0.85 0.93 1.26 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.00 0.78 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.17 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.43 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.82 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 0.94 0.93 0.94 1.09 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.07 1.30 0.92 0.93 0.93 1.02 0.82 
Abanka d.d 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.04 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.78 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 0.94 0.96 0.94 1.04 0.66 0.93 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.85 1.01 0.98 1.06 1.06 0.77 




Figure S1. Convergence in productivity for the period 2011-2012 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S2. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2011-2012 
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Figure S3. Convergence in technology for the period 2011-2012 
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Figure S4. Convergence in productivity for the period 2012-2013 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S5. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2012-2013 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S6. Convergence in technology for the period 2012-2013 
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Figure S7. Convergence in productivity for the period 2013-2014 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S8. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2013-2014 
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Figure S9. Convergence in technology for the period 2013-2014 
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Figure S10. Convergence in productivity for the period 2014-2015 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S11. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2014-2015 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S12. Convergence in technology for the period 2014-2015 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S13. Convergence in productivity for the period 2015-2016 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S14. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2015-2016 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S15. Convergence in technology for the period 2015-2016 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S16. Convergence in productivity for the period 2016-2017 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S17. Convergence in efficiency for the period 2016-2017 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   




Figure S18. Convergence in technology for the period 2016-2017 
𝛽-Convergence & Liquid Assets Ratio 𝛽-Convergence & Capital Adeq. Ratio Kernel Densities 
   
   
   
   





Table S7. Convergence results for the period 2011-2012 
 Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.120*** -0.248***     0.008 -0.046     -0.135*** -0.225***   
Staff Expenses -0.183*** -0.520***     0.003 -0.044     -0.191*** -0.505***   
NPLs -0.290*** -0.618***     -0.016 -0.118**     -0.316*** -0.616***   
Net Loans -0.001 0.006     0.024 0.056     -0.055 -0.098   
Other Earn. Assets -0.111* -0.109**     0.018 -0.107***     -0.166*** -0.027   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.111 -0.245*** -0.003   -0.001 -0.049 0.003   -0.121 -0.219*** -0.004 
Staff Expenses -0.142** -0.507*** -0.014   -0.009 -0.048 0.004   -0.140** -0.488*** -0.018 
NPLs -0.484*** -0.670*** 0.065**   -0.042 -0.129** 0.008   -0.526*** -0.671*** 0.071** 
Net Loans -0.154 0.017 0.060   0.042 0.055 -0.007   -0.212** -0.087 0.062* 
Other Earn. Assets -0.013 -0.096* -0.031   0.309** -0.064 -0.089**   -0.375** -0.055 0.067 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.116** -0.246*** 0.000   0.038 -0.032 -0.003   -0.159*** -0.234*** 0.002 
Staff Expenses -0.176*** -0.518*** -0.001   0.026 -0.035 -0.002   -0.201*** -0.507*** 0.001 
NPLs -0.328*** -0.626*** 0.004   -0.006 -0.114* -0.001   -0.366*** -0.625*** 0.005 
Net Loans 0.020 0.007 -0.002   0.057 0.057 -0.003   -0.067 -0.098 0.001 
Other Earn. Assets 0.055 -0.087* -0.015**   0.152* -0.089** -0.012**   -0.138 -0.024 -0.003 
 
 
Table S8. Convergence results for the period 2012-2013 
 Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.314*** -0.713***     -0.029 -0.092*     -0.323*** -0.717***   
Staff Expenses -0.220*** -0.744***     -0.017 -0.158**     -0.239*** -0.743***   
NPLs -0.369*** -0.794***     0.013 -0.082     -0.395*** -0.785***   
Net Loans -0.060 -0.084     -0.018 -0.421***     -0.325*** -0.148   
Other Earn. Assets -0.061 -0.037     -0.001 -0.110**     -0.120*** 0.028   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.371*** -0.726*** 0.020   -0.093** -0.117** 0.020   -0.359*** -0.726*** 0.013 
Staff Expenses -0.283*** -0.753*** 0.023   -0.081* -0.179*** 0.022*   -0.277*** -0.749*** 0.014 
NPLs -0.589*** -0.828*** 0.079**   -0.093 -0.136** 0.032**   -0.579*** -0.815*** 0.067** 
Net Loans -0.168 -0.078 0.043   -0.137* -0.422*** 0.045*   -0.325* -0.148 0.000 
Other Earn. Assets 0.189 0.005 -0.078*   0.110 -0.091 -0.034   -0.068 0.036 -0.017 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.515*** -0.722*** 0.076   -0.178*** -0.116** 0.054**   -0.451*** -0.725*** 0.048 
Staff Expenses -0.318** -0.752*** 0.037   -0.210*** -0.183*** 0.071***   -0.230* -0.743*** -0.004 
NPLs -0.672*** -0.812*** 0.114**   -0.246*** -0.124** 0.093***   -0.557*** -0.797*** 0.061 
Net Loans -0.165 -0.092 0.039   -0.308** -0.431*** 0.109**   -0.257 -0.141 -0.025 





Table S9. Convergence results for the period 2013-2014 
2013-2014 
Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.078 -0.211**     -0.043** -0.061     -0.057 -0.198*   
Staff Expenses -0.119*** -0.436***     -0.037** -0.121**     -0.107*** -0.399***   
NPLs -0.071 -0.313*     -0.073*** -0.118**     -0.031 -0.275   
Net Loans -0.055 -0.142**     -0.047** 0.006     -0.035 -0.202***   
Other Earn. Assets -0.153* -0.121**     -0.197** -0.066     0.009 -0.085***   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.113 -0.222** 0.011   0.036 -0.024 -0.024**   -0.163 -0.229** 0.035 
Staff Expenses -0.178** -0.460*** 0.020   0.029 -0.088* -0.022**   -0.221*** -0.439*** 0.039 
NPLs -0.326 -0.398** 0.085   -0.023 -0.089 -0.015   -0.340 -0.369* 0.103 
Net Loans -0.205*** -0.145** 0.057**   -0.009 0.012 -0.014   -0.217*** -0.203*** 0.069*** 
Other Earn. Assets -0.310 -0.141** 0.051   -0.384* -0.094 0.060   -0.012 -0.087*** 0.007 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.280 -0.232** 0.071   -0.120 -0.070 0.027   -0.214 -0.215** 0.055 
Staff Expenses -0.570*** -0.460*** 0.163**   -0.038 -0.122** 0.000   -0.583*** -0.422*** 0.172** 
NPLs -1.178** -0.377** 0.397**   -0.211* -0.138*** 0.048   -1.091** -0.340* 0.379* 
Net Loans -0.296 -0.152** 0.087   -0.136 0.003 0.032   -0.221 -0.211*** 0.067 
Other Earn. Assets 0.426 -0.117** -0.211   0.368 -0.063 -0.206   0.040 -0.085*** -0.011 
 
 
Table S10. Convergence results for the period 2014-2015 
 Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.354*** -0.768***     -0.017 -0.066     -0.347*** -0.733***   
Staff Expenses -0.107*** -0.337***     -0.027* -0.155***     -0.095*** -0.242***   
NPLs -0.215*** -0.497***     -0.010 -0.076     -0.222*** -0.472***   
Net Loans -0.027 -0.089**     -0.072** -0.031     0.020 -0.106***   
Other Earn. Assets -0.159** -0.121**     -0.136* -0.210***     -0.089** 0.045   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.572*** -0.790*** 0.081**   -0.074** -0.084** 0.019*   -0.542*** -0.761*** 0.071** 
Staff Expenses -0.099* -0.334*** -0.003   -0.052* -0.161*** 0.009   -0.059 -0.226*** -0.012 
NPLs -0.297** -0.522*** 0.028   -0.104** -0.119** 0.030***   -0.245** -0.479*** 0.008 
Net Loans -0.086* -0.094** 0.022   -0.172*** -0.039 0.038**   0.054 -0.102*** -0.012 
Other Earn. Assets -0.282* -0.136** 0.042   -0.290 -0.228*** 0.052   -0.114 0.041 0.009 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.808*** -0.802*** 0.157*   -0.193** -0.088** 0.060**   -0.709*** -0.768*** 0.124 
Staff Expenses -0.355*** -0.358*** 0.087**   -0.103 -0.163*** 0.026   -0.289** -0.262*** 0.067* 
NPLs -0.731*** -0.543*** 0.179**   -0.141 -0.096** 0.044   -0.659** -0.514*** 0.151* 
Net Loans -0.255** -0.095** 0.081*   -0.377*** -0.039 0.108**   0.073 -0.104*** -0.018 










Table S11. Convergence results for the period 2015-2016 
2015-2016 
Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.145* -0.351**     -0.077* -0.243***     -0.123* -0.245   
Staff Expenses -0.185*** -0.783***     -0.032 -0.346***     -0.191*** -0.644***   
NPLs -0.109 -0.272*     -0.028 -0.139**     -0.129** -0.267*   
Net Loans -0.035* -0.075**     0.010 -0.300***     -0.139*** 0.073   
Other Earn. Assets -0.138** -0.101**     -0.013 -0.148**     -0.175*** 0.010   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets 0.124 -0.227 -0.083*   -0.129 -0.262*** 0.016   0.176 -0.108*** -0.093*** 
Staff Expenses -0.130 -0.769*** -0.020   0.023 -0.327*** -0.019   -0.181*** -0.643*** -0.004*** 
NPLs 0.128 -0.167 -0.075*   -0.060 -0.155** 0.010   0.083* -0.177*** -0.068*** 
Net Loans 0.012 -0.069* -0.017   0.173** -0.277*** -0.057**   -0.287*** 0.064* 0.055* 
Other Earn. Assets -0.273* -0.118** 0.045   -0.106 -0.159*** 0.031   -0.249*** 0.000*** 0.025** 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets 0.276 -0.285 -0.137   0.161 -0.197** -0.077   0.006 -0.230 -0.043 
Staff Expenses -0.235 -0.789*** 0.017   0.090 -0.320*** -0.040   -0.362** -0.655*** 0.059 
NPLs 0.108 -0.250 -0.073   0.110 -0.114* -0.045   -0.092 -0.264* -0.013 
Net Loans -0.077 -0.079** 0.014   0.371* -0.267*** -0.120*   -0.689*** 0.043 0.188*** 
Other Earn. Assets -0.276 -0.098* 0.049   -0.267 -0.141** 0.091   -0.009 0.007 -0.059 
 
 
Table S12. Convergence results for the period 2016-2017 
 Convergence in Productivity    Convergence in Efficiency   Convergence in Technology 
β0 β1     β0 β1     β0 β1   
Fixed Assets -0.110*** -0.171**     -0.133*** -0.178*     -0.100** -0.273***   
Staff Expenses -0.049** -0.082     -0.055 -0.047     -0.059*** -0.303***   
NPLs -0.188*** -0.412***     -0.126*** -0.076     -0.102* -0.393***   
Net Loans -0.007 0.008     -0.065 -0.024     -0.076** -0.318***   
Other Earn. Assets -0.209*** -0.209***     -0.141* -0.277***     -0.175*** -0.015   
                        
Liquid Assets Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.248*** -0.199** 0.048**   -0.126 -0.176* -0.002   -0.273*** -0.300*** 0.061*** 
Staff Expenses -0.035 -0.083 -0.005   -0.021 -0.052 -0.013   -0.067* -0.302*** 0.003 
NPLs -0.333*** -0.426*** 0.053   -0.068 -0.049 -0.018   -0.291*** -0.404*** 0.070** 
Net Loans -0.037 0.011 0.012   0.028 -0.032 -0.036   -0.150* -0.309*** 0.029 
Other Earn. Assets -0.279 -0.216*** 0.024   -0.133 -0.276*** -0.003   -0.323*** -0.031 0.052 
                        
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2   β0 β1 β2 
Fixed Assets -0.341** -0.187** 0.078   -0.097 -0.173* -0.012   -0.445** -0.290*** 0.118** 
Staff Expenses -0.163 -0.089 0.039   -0.138 -0.056 0.028   -0.135 -0.308*** 0.026 
NPLs -0.673** -0.433*** 0.167*   -0.026 -0.060 -0.033   -0.677*** -0.411*** 0.199** 
Net Loans -0.328*** 0.004 0.112***   -0.147 -0.026 0.028   -0.368* -0.322*** 0.101 
Other Earn. Assets 0.456 -0.209*** -0.233*   0.699* -0.270*** -0.292**   -0.415* -0.011 0.085 
 
 
 
